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The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in Domestic
Counterterrorism
Aziz Z. Huq*
A wave of attempted domestic terrorism attacks in 2009 and 2010 has sharpened attention to
the threat of domestic-source terrorism inspired or directed by al Qaeda. Seeking to preempt that
terror, governments face an information problem. They must separate signals of terrorism risk
from potentially overwhelming background noise and persuade juries or fact finders that those
signals warrant coercive action. Selection of accurate signals of terrorism danger in the
information-poor circumstances of domestic counterterrorism is arguably a central challenge
today for law enforcement tasked with preventing further terrorist attacks. To an
underappreciated extent, governments have used religious speech as a proxy for terrorism risk in
order to resolve this signaling problem. This Article analyzes the legal and policy significance of
state reliance upon religious speech as a predictor of terrorism risk. Constitutional doctrine
under the Religion Clauses does recognize interests implicated by the signaling function of
religious speech. Yet analysis suggests that such doctrinal protection is fragile. Symptomatic of a
wider inflexibility of pre-9/11 constitutional doctrine, this doctrinal protection shows little
capacity for responsive change. The absence of constitutional barriers, however, does not mean
government should persist in relying on religious speech as a signal. Rather, analysis of
counterterrorism policy concerns suggests another path. Institutional considerations and an
emerging social science literature on terrorism suggest that religious speech is ill suited to the
signaling role it now plays. Instead, empirical social science on terrorism points to the epistemic
superiority of a different signal: the close associations of a terrorism suspect. The Article
concludes by examining the constitutionality of such a signal and elaborating ways that insight
from the new social science of terrorism can be realized without compromising important
individual interests.
I.

Introduction
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, law enforcement agencies in the

United States and Europe have strived to anticipate and to intervene early against alleged
terrorist conspiracies.1 Governments focus investigative or regulatory resources on a
point substantially before the occurrence of violence, sometimes before clear evidence
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful for participants at
faculty workshops at the University of Chicago Law School, Cardozo Law School, Columbia Law School,
the George Washington University Law School, Harvard Law School, the University of Michigan Law
School, and the University of Virginia Law School for helpful comments and incisive criticism, and to the
staff of the Texas Law Review for excellent editorial work. I am especially grateful to the Carnegie
Scholars Fellowship for provided funding during the research and drafting of this Article, and to the Frank
Cicero, Jr. Faculty Fund for support during the completion of this Article. All errors, of course, are mine
alone.
1. See, e.g., Memorandum from Att’y Gen. John Ashcroft to Heads of Department Components (Nov.
8, 2001), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2001/November/01_ag_580.htm (announcing that the Justice
Department “must shift its primary focus from investigating and prosecuting past crimes to identifying
threats of future terrorist acts, preventing them from happening, and punishing would-be perpetrators”).
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demonstrates violence to be imminent. This preemptive approach, however, creates an
informational problem for governments. They must act without the factual predicates that
typically flag criminal violence. Governments, that is, often lack reliable signals of the
intention to commit or abet violence and must instead identify new signals of
dangerousness to serve as proxies for overt evidence of a terrorist threat. Selection of
accurate signals of terrorism danger in the information-poor circumstances of domestic
counterterrorism is arguably the central challenge for law enforcement tasked with
prevention of further terrorist attacks on American soil. The task has taken on new
urgency after a wave of domestic-source terrorism incidents in late 2009 and early 2010.2
Those attempts prompted the White House in the May 2010 National Security Strategy to
“underscore[] the threat to the United States and our interests posed by individuals
radicalized at home.”3
My aim in this Article is to evaluate one proxy that governments use as a solution to
this signaling problem. Religious speech has to an underappreciated extent4 become for
law enforcement in both the United States and the United Kingdom a signal to identify
high-risk terrorist threats. Consider the following examples:5
 Federal law enforcement officers arrest a Pakistani immigrant recently returned from
what might have been training in a foreign terrorist camp. Unable to prove that the
suspect in fact received training, the Government charges him with a “material
support” offense6 in relation to a planned future attack. To show the suspect’s intent to
commit this future attack, the Government relies on an Arabic note found in his wallet
2. These include the decision of a Somali-American to travel back to Somalia and become the first
American suicide bomber; the July 2009 arrest of seven Muslims in North Carolina; the September 2009
arrest of Afghan-born Najibullah Zazi based on allegations that he intended to complete an attack on the
New York subway system; the November 5, 2009 shooting spree by Army psychiatrist Major Nidal Hassan
at Fort Hood, TX, which left thirteen dead; the December 2009 arrest of Pakistani-American David
Headley and others in connection with the 2008 Mumbai attacks; the Christmas Day 2009 attempt by
Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to detonate explosives on board Detroit-bound Northwest Air, flight
253; the May 1, 2010 attempt by Pakistani-born American citizen Faisal Shahzad to explode a car bomb in
New York’s Times Square; and the June 5, 2010 arrest of two New Jersey men allegedly on their way to
fight in Somalia. See generally Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown (Counter)Terrorism, 88 TEXAS
L. REV. 1715, 1716 & n.8 (2010) (recognizing the “ascendancy of homegrown terrorism” and discussing
the examples listed above as well as others).
HOUSE,
NATIONAL
SECURITY
STRATEGY
19
(2010),
available
at
3. WHITE
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
4. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1413, 1419 n.22 (2002) (explicitly declining, in an important article about post-9/11 profiling, to address
religious profiling); infra subpart II(B).
5. See infra Part II.
6. For the various “material support” criminal offenses, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A–2339C (2006).
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at the time of arrest that reads, “Oh Allah, we place you at their throats, and we seek
refuge in you from their evil.” The jury convicts.7
 Immigration officials refuse entry to a religious scholar—whose sermons and
scholarship, they believe, implicitly condone antidemocratic violence—for fear that he
will win converts while a visiting professor at a major university. The scholar is unable
to enter the country.8
 Days after the September 11 attacks, an imam in a Virginia mosque gives a sermon to
a select core group of male congregants, praising resistance to injustice against
Muslims. Two of his listeners decide to go to Afghanistan to fight the U.S. forces
deployed there. Based on their decision and the contents of his sermon, the imam is
charged and convicted on federal conspiracy and incitement charges.9
In each of these cases, law enforcement has not had unequivocal evidence of an
intention to commit acts of violence. Instead, it has leaned on religious speech or doctrine
as a proxy for a suspect’s intention to violate the law in the future or to encourage others
to violate the law. In this fashion, religious speech plays a signaling function in the
course of domestic counterterrorism focused on minority Muslim communities.10
Attention to the religious speech of these communities is a consequence of al Qaeda’s
explicitly religious justifications for the September 11 attacks and its subsequent appeals
for support grounded in religious solidarity.11 This attention means immigration officials,
prosecutors, and juries are scrutinizing doctrinal intricacies, previously the domain of the
devout and scholastic, to discern who among a minority religious or ethnic community
poses a terrorist threat.
But is such reliance constitutional? The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
seem, at least on their face, to restrain the government’s reliance on such proxies.12 And
even if constitutional, is reliance on religious speech as a signal in the domestic
7. Amy Waldman, Prophetic Justice, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2006, at 82.
8. Pamela Constable, Divisive Scholar Draws Parallels Between Islam and Democracy, WASH. POST,
Apr. 11, 2007, at B6.
9. Jerry Markon, Va. Muslim Spiritual Leader Gets Life, WASH. POST, July 13, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/13/AR2005071301596.html.
10. Predictably, the costs of post-9/11 counterterrorism law enforcement have landed disproportionately
on Muslim-American communities. Aziz Huq, The New Counterterrorism: Investigating Terror,
Investigating Muslims, in LIBERTY UNDER ATTACK: RECLAIMING OUR FREEDOMS IN AN AGE OF TERROR
167, 182 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2007).
11. See generally MARY HABECK, KNOWING THE ENEMY: JIHADIST IDEOLOGY AND THE WAR ON
TERROR 7–14 (2006) (summarizing al Qaeda’s putative theological justifications for the September 11
attacks); MESSAGES TO THE WORLD: THE STATEMENTS OF OSAMA BIN LADEN 104–05, 109 (Bruce
Lawrence ed., 2005).
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
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counterterrorism context wise? Under what circumstances does religious speech function
as an effective signal of and proxy for the intention to commit terrorist violence? How
best is the signaling problem in domestic counterterrorism resolved?
This Article evaluates government reliance on religious speech as a signal in
counterterrorism through the lenses of constitutional law and counterterrorism policy.
Consider first the constitutional question. The government’s use of religious speech as a
signal of terrorism risk indirectly casts a shadow on the exercise of religious liberties.
When the government declares in the context of a criminal investigation or trial that a
religious phrase or doctrine will be treated as evidence of terrorist intent, it creates a
nontrivial incentive on the part of a suspect’s co-religionists not to use that phrase or
doctrine. Use of religious speech as a signal thus interposes the government, albeit
obliquely, into the ongoing confessional life of a religious community in a way that can
change the terms of doctrinal and spiritual practice. The Supreme Court has recognized a
religious community’s interest in epistemic autonomy—a communal freedom to hold and
to revise religious views. But doctrinal protection of this epistemic autonomy is fragile. It
supplies inadequate resources to resist post-9/11 pressures. This is symptomatic of a
wider trend: the failure of pre-9/11 constitutional doctrine to respond to new ways in
which constitutional rights are compromised as government confronts a new kind of
terrorism threat.
But that does not mean the government should persist in relying on religious speech
as a signal. Rather, institutional considerations and an emerging social science literature
concerning the etiology of terrorism suggest that religious speech is ill suited to the
signaling role it now plays. In institutional terms, government is ill equipped to make
judgments about the meaning of religious speech. The error rate in state interpretations of
religious speech will hence be high. More importantly, recent empirical social science
research concerning the origins and predicates of terrorism suggests that variance in
religious speech does not correlate with the risk of terrorist violence. This empirical and
social science work suggests the superiority of a different signal: the close associations of
a suspect. Terrorism’s emergence is regularly associated with the presence of insular
groups that break off from the cultural or subcultural mainstream to form their own
discrete ethical and normative subcultures. Identification of these insular groups, and not
4

some search for particular kinds of religiosity, provides some guidance as to the likely
incidence of terrorist violence.
I compare religious speech and close associations by applying tools developed in the
economics literature to solve signaling problems. Economic analysis of signaling
problems shows that a signal is effective when “the cost of the signal is negatively
correlated with the unseen characteristic that is [sought].”13 (Consider, for example, the
function of education in the job market: Provided the cost of education is inversely
related to productivity, education levels can signal a potential employee’s productivity to
employers even if education itself does not increase marginal productivity.)14 Applying
this framework to the terrorism context suggests that law enforcement should not rely on
religious speech as a signal and instead should develop strategies to disaggregate the
insular and close-knit groups in which terrorism emerges from a wider religious or ethnic
cohort.15
This Article has two supplemental goals. First, it aims to prompt more empirically
informed dialogue about the evolution of counterterrorism practice and legal doctrine. It
seems likely that the first wave of counterterrorism policies adopted after 9/11, many
under tight time and informational constraints, included suboptimal practices as a result
of policy makers’ bounded rationality and imperfect information. Possible welfare gains
are to be found in updating and improving those policies.16 Yet despite the switch of
administrations in the White House, the course of federal counterterrorism policy has
been characterized by more continuity than change.17 Second, the September 11 attacks
catalyzed new investments in social science and empirical work on the causes and
13. Michael Spence, Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets, 92 AM. ECON.
REV. 434, 437 (2002); see also PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY 100–07
(2005).
14. Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355, 361–68 (1973).
15. A similar analysis has been applied to the problem of airport screening to suggest that reliance on
visible attributes is suboptimal. Atin Basuchoudhary & Laura Razzolini, Hiding in Plain Sight—Using
Signals to Detect Terrorists, 128 PUB. CHOICE 245, 254 (2006). The present analysis extends that basic
framework to a different context.
16. But see ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND
THE COURTS 33–34 (2007) (opining that the political process generally prevents liberal democratic
governments from adopting policies that unnecessarily restrict liberty).
17. See Peter Baker, Obama’s War Over Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010 (Magazine), at 33
(observing that during his first year in office President Obama “has adopted the bulk of the
counterterrorism strategy he found on his desk when he arrived in the Oval Office, a strategy already
moderated from the earliest days after Sept. 11, 2001”).
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consequences of terrorism.18 Yet this empirical literature is rarely invoked in the legal
academy’s debates on security policy. This is a needless loss.
Part II of the Article introduces the problem by describing criminal and immigration
proceedings in which government has acted preemptively by relying on religious speech.
Part III turns to the religious liberty issues under the First Amendment. It contends that
the constitutional interests at stake are largely “underenforced.”19 Part IV examines the
policy dimensions of reliance on religious speech as a signal, drawing on recent empirical
work to query how religious speech correlates with the incidence of terrorism and then
proposes association as an alternative.
II.

Religious Speech and Doctrine as a Signal in Counterterrorism
Religious speech and doctrine play an increasingly significant, if underappreciated,

role in domestic counterterrorism enforcement in the United States and elsewhere thanks
to a post-9/11 shift to preemptive policing strategies. This Part explores the causes of that
trend and sets forth examples of religious speech’s use as a signal in criminal law,
immigration, and other enforcement actions in the United States and the United
Kingdom.
A. Preemptive Domestic Counterterrorism Strategies

Terrorist attacks have potentially catastrophic consequences. Unlike the policing of
burglary, murder, or fraud, a counterterrorism policing strategy wholly reliant on
interdicting past offenders likely will be suboptimal. And for most governments,
“prosecution of completed terrorist acts [alone] is not deemed sufficient.”20 As a result,
numerous governments have adopted a preemptive approach to terrorist interdiction since
9/11 that is aimed at the early stages of terrorist conspiracies. At the same time, they have
18. See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON SOC., BEHAVIORAL & ECON. SCIS., NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL,
COMBATING TERRORISM: RESEARCH PRIORITIES IN THE SOCIAL, BEHAVIORAL AND ECONOMIC SCIENCES 6
(2006) (chronicling the formation of the Task Force on Anti-Terrorism Research and Development in the
aftermath of the September 11 attacks).
19. See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978) (explaining that “underenforced” constitutional
norms occur in “those situations in which the [Supreme Court], because of institutional concerns, has failed
to enforce a provision of the Constitution to its full conceptual boundaries”).
20. Wayne McCormack, Inchoate Terrorism: Liberalism Clashes with Fundamentalism, 37 GEO. J.
INT’L L. 1, 18 (2005).
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invested more resources in domestic counterterrorism policing.21 Because terrorism often
lacks many of the overt antecedent acts associated with quotidian crime, and because a
suspect’s preparatory conduct may be evidence of terrorism only in hindsight,22 law
enforcement must identify and deploy new signals of terrorist intent to sort threats from
the general population.
Governments overtly adopted a preemptive approach soon after 9/11. In November
2001, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft announced that the U.S. Department of
Justice “must shift its primary focus from investigating and prosecuting past crimes to
identifying threats of future terrorist acts, preventing them from happening, and
punishing would-be perpetrators.”23 The Justice Department now leans on inchoate or
“precursor” offenses such as the material support statutes that allow for prosecution long
before an act of terrorism is imminent.24 The federal government also supplements
criminal prosecution with regulatory complements. Immigration regulation, with its
relaxed procedural constraints and more expansive substantive reach, also supplies the
government with tools to act in the absence of clear evidence of imminent violence.25
21. See, e.g., TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, CRIMINAL TERRORISM
ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE FIVE YEARS SINCE THE 9/11/01 ATTACKS (2006),
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/169/ (“In the twelve months immediately after 9/11, the prosecution
of individuals the government classified as international terrorists surged sharply higher than in the
previous year.”); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet: Department of Justice Anti-Terrorism Efforts
Since Sept. 11, 2001 (Sept. 5, 2006), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2006/September/06_opa_590.html
(outlining the various measures taken by the Department of Justice to combat domestic terrorism since
9/11, including prosecuting and convicting more terrorists, increasing border security funding, and
restructuring the FBI to eliminate more terrorist threats). More recent data suggests that criminal justice
resources have been deployed in a more “efficient” manner. CTR. ON LAW & SEC., N.Y.U. SCH. OF LAW,
TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD, at i (2010).
22. Consider the purchase of box cutters by the 9/11 hijackers. Serge Schmemman, US Attacked:
President Vows to Exact Punishment for ‘Evil,’ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A1.
23. Memorandum from Att’y Gen. John Ashcroft, supra note 1; see also Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y
Gen., Prepared Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute (May 24, 2006), available at
http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2006/dag_speech_060524.html (“And, in deciding whether to
prosecute, we will not wait to see what can become of risks. The death and destruction of September 11,
2001, mandate a transformed and preventative approach.”).
24. For surveys of the use of material support and related criminal offenses as preemptive tools, see
Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention
Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1101–03 (2008), and Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy?
Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 44692
(2007). Applications of one section of the material support statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006), were upheld
against constitutional challenge in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2731 (2010).
25. See generally Donald Kerwin & Margaret D. Stock, The Role of Immigration in a Coordinated
National Security Policy, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 383, 398–423 (2007) (surveying the function of
immigration law in counterterrorism strategy).
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The trend toward preemptive strategies has been accelerated by growing concern
about terrorism that originates at home rather than abroad. The September 11 attacks
originated overseas.26 But other recent terrorist attacks, first in Europe and then in the
United States, have had domestic origins.27 As a result, governments on both sides of the
Atlantic have placed special emphasis on the need to identify and eliminate domestic
“sleeper cells.”28 Since the early 1990s, the British government has monitored al Qaeda
efforts to recruit within the United Kingdom and to establish a domestic network.29
British counterterrorism strategy singles out local Muslim communities as places where
radicalization and recruitment to terrorism occur.30 And even before the July 2005 attacks
on London buses and trains, British media sounded regular alarms about the possibility
that residents of the United Kingdom might commit acts of terrorism.31
In the United States, federal officials also took seriously the risk of “homegrown”
terrorism after 9/11, albeit later than in the United Kingdom. In January 2007, for
example, a Homeland Security official told a House of Representatives committee that
26. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
155 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
27. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE BOMBINGS IN LONDON ON 7TH JULY 2005, at
13 (2006) [hereinafter REPORT ON LONDON BOMBINGS], available at http://www.officialdocuments.gov.uk/document/hc0506/hc10/1087/1087.pdf (asserting that the perpetrators of the bombings
in London grew up on the outskirts of Leeds in West Yorkshire).
28. See Intelligence Reform: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 110th Cong. 89
(2007) [hereinafter Intelligence Reform Hearing] (statement of Charles E. Allen, Assistant Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis, Chief Intelligence Officer, Department of Homeland Security) (describing new
focus on “domestic terrorists” including “Islamic extremists (Sunni and Shia)”). In 2002, federal authorities
identified a suspected sleeper cell in Lakawanna, New York, leading to high-profile arrests and convictions.
DINA TEMPLE-RASTON, THE JIHAD NEXT DOOR, at xiii, 198–205 (2007).
29. See U.K. HOME DEP’T, THE UNITED KINGDOM’S STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM 28 (2009) [hereinafter U.K. STRATEGY] (“By the early nineties some propagandists for
Egyptian and other organisations had settled in London. . . . Al Qa‘ida recruited people from the UK and
established a network here.”).
30. Id. at 15.
31. See, e.g., Don’t Point, ECONOMIST, Jan. 8, 2005, at 51 (discussing the intensified fears regarding a
terrorist attack in Britain); Daniel McGrory, The New Enemy Within, TIMES (U.K.), Dec. 6, 2003, at 19
(discussing the typical British-born sleepers that are recruited into Islamic terror groups); Martin Bright &
Jason
Burke,
Is
There
an
Enemy
Within?,
OBSERVER
(U.K.),
Feb. 27,
2005,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/feb/27/terrorism.september11 (reporting fears among government and
security officials that “the threat from British Muslim extremists is now at least as great as that from
foreign terrorists”); Philip Johnston, Home-Grown Fundamentalists Pose a Threat to Britain, Too,
TELEGRAPH (U.K.), May 2, 2003, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3590781/Homegrown-fundamentalists-pose-a-threat-to-Britain-too.html (discussing the involvement of two British
Muslims in a suicide bomb attack in Israel); Raymond Whitaker et al., Special Report: Terror in Britain:
The Terror Timebomb, INDEP. (U.K.), Apr. 4, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 10582926 (chronicling the
efforts of Islamist extremists to recruit disaffected young British Muslims).
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domestic “radicalization challenges” had prompted the creation of a new unit in the
Department of Homeland Security “focused exclusively on radicalization in the
Homeland.”32 In May 2009, the Senate Homeland Security Committee held a hearing on
“Violent Islamist Extremism: al-Shabaab Recruitment in America,” exploring terrorist
recruitment among Minneapolis’s Somali-American population. According to FBI
testimony, government surveillance and analysis had found Minneapolis to be a site of
“an active and deliberate attempt to recruit individuals . . . to travel to Somalia to fight or
train on behalf of [the Somali Islamist movement].”33 This prompted law enforcement
“concern[]” that a U.S. national recruited in Minnesota might return from fighting
overseas “to conduct attacks inside the United States.”34 The concern escalated after a
series of domestic-source terrorism incidents in late 2009 and early 2010.35 In May 2010,
Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John
Brennan warned that “an increasing number of individuals here in the United States
[have] become captivated by extremist activities or causes.”36 This caution took official
form in the 2010 National Security Strategy, which stated that “recent incidences of
violent extremists in the United States” demonstrate “the threat to the United States and
our interests posed by individuals radicalized at home.”37
It is the rising concerns about domestic terrorism and the demand for prophylaxis
and prevention of terrorism attacks that in tandem push law enforcement toward novel
investigation and prosecution strategies. Prosecutors must establish culpability for serious
32. Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Intelligence Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) (written
testimony of Charles E. Allen, Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Chief Intelligence Officer,
Department of Homeland Security) (on file with author).
33. Violent Islamist Extremism—2009: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and
Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 101 (2009) (statement of Philip Mudd, Associate Executive Assistant
Director, FBI).
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., James C. McKinley, Jr., Major Held in Fort Hood Rampage Is Charged with 13 Counts of
Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2009, at A14 (reporting the charging of Major Nidal Malik Hasan, who
espoused “beliefs that America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were wars against all Muslims,” with
thirteen counts of murder after he opened fire at Fort Hood); William K. Rashbaum, 2 Men Seized at
J.F.K., Accused of Plotting Jihad, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2010, at A1 (reporting the arrest of two men who
were seeking to “join[] an Islamic extremist group to kill American troops”); Andrea Elliott et al., For
Times
Sq.
Suspect,
Long
Roots
of
Discontent,
N.Y.
TIMES,
May 15,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/nyregion/16suspect.html (reporting on Faisal Shahzad, the man
accused of planting a car bomb in Times Square).
36. Obama’s New Security Strategy Stresses Diplomacy, BBC NEWS, May 27, 2010,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10169144.
37. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 3, at 19.
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criminal offenses even though they have fewer overt acts with which to work. In doing
so, they face a serious information deficit. Downstream, prosecutors also have fewer
reliable indicators of guilt upon which to build a case. Sorting for individuals who present
a danger will be consistently more difficult at both the investigative and prosecution
stages. And it is to remedy this informational deficit that law enforcement and
prosecutors turn to religious speech as a signal of terrorist risk.
B. Criminal Prosecutions and Religious Speech

In April 2006, a jury convicted Hamid Hayat, a Californian of Pakistani descent, of
material support for terrorism.38 Federal prosecutors had charged Hayat with one count of
providing material support for a transnational terrorist act and three counts of making
willful, false statements related to a journey in 2003 or 2004 to Pakistan, allegedly to
“receive jihadist training.”39 Yet Hayat had committed no act of violence. And scant
evidence demonstrated his intent to commit a future act of violence, which was an
element of the material support offense.40 While he had confessed to having visited a
training camp in Pakistan, it was unclear whether he had stayed long enough to receive
training.41 His confession was “vague and even contradictory.”42 On the material support
charge, the prosecution’s remaining evidence was equivocal.43 Unsurprisingly, Hayat’s
intention to commit future terrorism emerged as key for a successful prosecution.44

38. Rone Tempest, In Lodi Terror Case, Intent Was the Clincher, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 2006, at B1; see
also Government’s Trial Memorandum at 2–5, United States v. Hayat, No. S-05-240 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14,
2006) [hereinafter Hayat Trial Memo] (listing the counts).
39. Hayat Trial Memo, supra note 38, at 2–5. Hayat’s father Umer Hayat was also charged with two
counts of making false, material statements. Id. at 5. The charges against him were later dropped. Neil
MacFarquhar, Echoes of Terror Case Haunt California Pakistanis, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2007, at A1.
40. See Tempest, supra note 38 (noting that the prosecution “had no direct evidence”).
41. See John Diaz, The Phantom Terrorist Camp, SFGATE.COM, Sept. 16, 2007,
http://articles.sfgate.com/2007-09-16/opinion/17260704_1_terrorist-camp-fbi-headquarters-hamid-hayat
(noting that “the prosecution offered no direct evidence to corroborate Hayat’s admission of attending a
terrorist training camp” and that Hayat’s admissions of having attended the camp “were rife with bizarre
details and contradictions”).
42. Tempest, supra note 38.
43. Principally, the State relied on an “irresolute” confession with “scant and fuzzy” details of the
terrorist acts Hayat was to aid. Waldman, supra note 7, at 82–83; accord Diaz, supra note 41.
44. See Hayat Trial Memo, supra note 38, at 16 (describing the necessary mens rea as whether “the
defendant knew or intended that the material support and resources were to be used in preparation for or in
carrying out a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332b, which prohibits acts of terrorism transcending national
boundaries”).

10

To prove Hayat’s mens rea, the prosecution relied on an Arabic-language prayer
found in Hayat’s wallet at the time of his arrest.45 The prosecution labeled this “the throat
note.”46 Initially, the prosecution translated the Arabic text as, “Lord, let us be at their
throats, and we ask you to give us refuge from their evil.”47 When the defense objected to
this translation, negotiations resulted in the note being admitted into evidence translated
as “Oh Allah, we place you at their throats, and we seek refuge in you from their evil.”48
To demonstrate that the throat note was evidence of Hayat’s mens rea, the U.S.
Attorney proffered expert testimony from Professor Khaleel Mohammed, a professor of
religious studies at San Diego State University.49 Mohammed conceded that he did not
know Hayat.50 He also conceded that he did not know how Hayat understood the throat
note because Hayat himself had exercised his Fifth Amendment right not to testify.51 But,
Mohammed insisted, the throat note could be read in only one way. It was a prayer “used
by Muslim fanatics and extremists that consider themselves to be in a state of war with
the rest of the world or their own government.”52 Mohammed, that is, offered a
categorical reading of the note applicable to anyone sharing a particular religious
identity.53 Summarizing its case, the prosecution invoked the throat note to show that
Hayat had “a jihadi heart and a jihadi mind”54 and also as evidence that “Hayat attended a

45. See Waldman, supra note 7, at 83 (“[T]he prosecution cited [the note] as ‘probative evidence’ that
Hayat had ‘the requisite jihadist intent’ . . . .”).
46. Hayat Trial Memo, supra note 38, at 34.
47. Id.
48. Id.; see also Denny Walsh, Witness Is Pressed on Hayat Prayer, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 16, 2006,
http://www.sacbee.com/2006/03/16/6552/witness-is-pressed-on-hayat-prayer.html.
49. Waldman, supra note 7, at 89.
50. Walsh, supra note 48.
51. Stephen Magagnini, Closing Phase Begins Today in Lodi Terror Case, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 12,
2006, http://www.sacbee.com/2006/04/12/6580/closing-phase-begins-today-in.html; see also Mark Araz,
The Agent Who Might Have Saved Hamid Hayat, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 2006, at 1 (noting that Hayat did not
testify).
52. Walsh, supra note 48. Mohammed also testified that “the supplication would be carried by a holy
warrior ready to fight the enemies of Islam. He suggested that the throat is ‘the most vulnerable spot’ for a
‘mortal wound,’ and added, ‘You are asking God to be your champion.’” Demian Bulwa, Trial Focuses on
Notation: Warrior’s Creed or Simple Prayer, SFGATE.COM, Mar. 15, 2006, http://articles.sfgate.com/200603-15/bay-area/17284650_1_lodi-man-fbi-agents-umer-hayat.
53. Offered for the purposes of one case, Mohammed’s interpretation by definition claims a wider
applicability. Defense lawyers found several religious experts who disagreed with Mohammed’s
interpretation, but all proved “reluctant” to testify. Waldman, supra note 7, at 89–90. These experts may
have been unwilling to irk a potential future employer—the federal government.
54. Id. at 82.
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jihadist training camp” with “the requisite jihadist intent.”55 The throat note and other
religious speech in Hayat’s possession swung the jury toward conviction.56 Indeed, the
jury foreman subsequently explained that the throat note and related expert testimony had
been “quite critical.”57
Hayat’s case is not unique. Criminal prosecutions of a New York-based group of
thirteen alleged militants led by an Egyptian sheikh, Omar Abdul-Rahman, in the early
1990s also relied on the sheikh’s sermons as evidence of his involvement in a terrorist
conspiracy.58 The 2004 material support prosecution of Idaho webmaster Sami alHussayen hinged on evidence of religious dogma on the websites the defendant had
maintained, which was used in an effort to show his mens rea.59 One journalist observing
the trial later evaluated the Government’s case by saying that “it seemed as if the
government wanted to put the religion of Islam in the dock.”60 After a jury reached a
hung verdict in the 2007 trial of Narseal Baptiste and six others based on their alleged
conspiracy to attack the Sears Tower, the Government signaled its renewed commitment
to the case by reaching for evidence of the defendants’ religious views to demonstrate
their violent intent for a retrial.61 Similarly, in the 2008 retrial of the Holy Land
Foundation on terrorist-financing charges, prosecutors thought to introduce expert
evidence “that repeated use of traditional Muslim greetings can be a sign of unity with
terrorists” to establish the defendant’s intent.62

55. Hayat Trial Memo, supra note 38, at 35.
56. See Waldman, supra note 7, at 92 (explaining that the jury “conclud[ed] that the evidence
suggesting that Hayat would act—the scrapbook, the prayer, and so on—was stronger than the evidence
that he would not”).
57. Id. at 90.
58. Robert L. Jackson, Case Against Muslim Cleric Could Blow Up in Prosecutors’ Faces, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 1994, at A5; James C. McKinley Jr., Sheik’s Talk at Issue in Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1995,
at B2.
59. See PAUL M. BARRETT, AMERICAN ISLAM: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF A RELIGION 248–49
(2007) (describing the material that al-Hussayen allegedly disseminated over the Internet); Timothy Egan,
Computer Student on Trial over Muslim Web Site Work, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2004, at A16; Maureen
O’Hagan, A Terrorism Case that Went Awry, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 22, 2004,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2002097570_sami22m.html.
60. BARRETT, supra note 59, at 244.
61. See, e.g., Curt Anderson, Defense Fears Terrorism Retrial Won’t Be Fair to 6 Defendants, DAILY J.,
Jan. 3, 2008, available at http://www.daily-journal.com/archives/dj/display.php?id=411128 (noting
prosecutors’ intention to introduce evidence to portray the ringleader of the plot as a “Muslim fanatic”).
62. Jason Trahan, Lawyers Tangle About Greetings, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Sept. 25, 2008, at 1B. The
prosecution did not go forward with this strategy.
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In each of these cases, prosecutors sought to use the criminal law preemptively. In
each case, lacking the necessary evidence of overt acts, U.S. Attorneys turned to religious
speech as a proxy for criminal intent. These prosecutions relied on the assumption that
religious speech could supply an accurate signal of an intention to commit acts of
terrorism. But these criminal trials, which in any event comprise only a fraction of a
criminal justice system dominated by plea bargaining, likely represent only a portion of
the total number of cases in which the government relies on religious speech. The
incidence of religious speech at the prosecution stage as a signal of criminal intent is
suggestive of a greater reliance on the same kind of evidence upstream—in
investigations. Even setting aside those investigations that do not end in charges, many
terrorism investigations (perhaps a majority) end in “pretextual” charges, from wire fraud
to immigration crimes.63 Such charges are unconnected with terrorism but form the
possible basis for a less costly type of punitive action.64 In those cases, the state’s
upstream reliance on religious speech for singling out a suspect is never revealed. At the
very least, therefore, any estimation of the use of religious speech as a signal in
counterterrorism that relies on reported trials is likely to yield an undercount, and
probably a substantial one.
Religious speech can play a second function in criminal prosecutions. It can also be
the actus reus for a terrorism offense. One example is a case that arose in Virginia soon
after 9/11. On the evening of September 11, 2001, an imam named Ali al-Timimi and his
circle of followers met at the storefront Dar al Arqam Center in Falls Church, Virginia:
At the meeting, Al-Timimi stated that the September 11 attacks were justified
and that the end of time battle had begun. He said that America was at war with
Islam, and that the attendees should leave the United States. The preferred
option was to heed the call of Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban, to participate
in the defense of Muslims in Afghanistan and fight against United States troops
that were expected to invade in pursuit of Al-Qaeda.65

63. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political
Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 622 (2005) (explaining the charging of
suspected terrorists with lesser offenses including immigration violations, identity theft, visa fraud, and
money laundering).
64. Cf. Harry Litman, Pretexual Prosecutions, 92 GEO. L.J. 1135, 1175–76 (2004) (defending the
practice of pretextual charges); Richman & Stuntz, supra note 63, at 584–87 (explaining pretextual
charges).
65. United States v. Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d 789, 810 (E.D. Va. 2004).

13

Based on that speech al-Timimi was prosecuted on several inchoate offense and
solicitation counts.66 In addition to the September 11 speech, the prosecution invoked a
February 2003 sermon in which al-Timimi spoke of the crash of the U.S. space shuttle
Columbia as an omen of the imminent end of the West’s domination of the Muslim
world.67 In an opening statement, the prosecutor focused on the content of the sermons,
asserting that “[the] case [was] about what Al-Timimi told the young men who respected
him, who revered him . . . who loved him, and most of all, who listened to him.”68 AlTimimi was convicted on ten counts of inducing or soliciting others to commit various
crimes related to his disciples’ overseas travel to aid the Taliban.69 Evidence of his actus
reus largely comprised his sermons.70 These statements, the jury concluded, had a
predictable effect on his codefendants, such that al-Timimi could be held criminally
liable.71
Al-Timimi’s case shows how religious speech or dogma can be a basis for
solicitation or aiding-and-abetting charges. Moreover, it suggests that such prosecutions
can rely on ambiguous religious statements that require interpretation. It is plausible to
posit slightly different factual circumstances in which a prosecutor would want to move
forward but would have to rely on speech with less substantial overt links to terrorism.
The same trend is visible in other countries. The United Kingdom has enacted laws
aimed at “changing the environment in which the extremists and those radicalising others
can operate”72 by criminalizing speech that often will be framed with religious
terminology. Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 criminalizes publications where the
publisher “intends members of the public to be directly or indirectly encouraged or
otherwise induced by the statement to commit, prepare or instigate acts of terrorism.”73
This “encouragement of terrorism” prohibition reaches “statements that are likely to be
66. McCormack, supra note 20, at 1 & n.1.
67. Milton Viorst, The Education of Ali al-Timimi, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 2006, at 69, 78.
68. Id.
69. McCormack, supra note 20, at 1 & n.1; Jerry Markon, Muslim Leader Is Found Guilty, WASH.
POST, Apr. 27, 2005, at A1.
70. See McCormack, supra note 20, at 2 (explaining that the acts resulting in al-Timimi’s convictions
primarily involved only speaking with and advising others).
71. See Markon, supra note 69 (describing prosecutorial arguments that al-Timimi’s words were
intended to cause violence and the subsequent guilty verdict imposed by the jury).
72. U.K. STRATEGY, supra note 29, at 12.
73. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 1(2)(b)(i).

14

understood by members of the public as indirectly encouraging the commission or
preparation of acts of terrorism” and also “every statement which . . . glorifies the
commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future, or generally) of such acts or
offences.”74 The offense “implement[s] the requirements of Article 5 of the Council of
Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism,” which requires state parties to
criminalize “‘public provocation to commit a terrorist offense.’”75 Another provision in
the 2006 Terrorism Act criminalizes “[d]issemination of terrorist publications,” including
circulating, selling, lending, or offering for sale or loan, any publication intended to be
“direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to the commission, preparation or
instigation of acts of terrorism.”76
Prosecutions under these provisions have been few, far between, and poorly
documented.77 In one high-profile case, an imam named Abu Izzadeen was arrested for
glorifying terrorism.78 While that charge was dropped, he was convicted of inciting
terrorism overseas and fundraising for terrorism under the Terrorism Act 2000.79 In
another case, a woman defendant who called herself the “lyrical terrorist” was convicted
under a different statutory terrorism offense of possession of “a record of information of a
kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism.”80 While
the information at issue included materials with practical implications for planning a
terrorist act,81 her trial was characterized by discussion of quasi-religious poems that she
74. Id. § 1(3) (emphasis added).
75. TERRORISM ACT 2006: EXPLANATORY NOTES ¶ 20, at 4 (2006).
76. Terrorism Act 2006, §§ 2(1)(a), 2(2).
77. According to a U.K. government audit of counterterrorism actions, there have been such actions.
See LORD CARLILE OF BERRIEW Q.C., REPORT ON THE OPERATION IN 2007 OF THE TERRORISM ACT 2000
AND OF PART I OF THE TERRORISM ACT 2006, at 56 (2008) (“There have been successful prosecutions
brought under the section [criminalizing the glorification of terrorism], and others are pending.”); CROWN
PROSECUTION SERV., VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND RELATED CRIMINAL OFFENCES § 5,
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/violent_extremism.html (describing some successful
antiterrorism prosecutions but none under the antiglorification laws).
78. But there have been some arrests. See, e.g., Sean O’Neill & Stewart Tendler, Islamist Radical who
Heckled Reid Is Arrested over ‘Glorifying of Terrorism,’ TIMES (U.K.), Feb. 9, 2007, at 2; Stephen Wright
et al., Hate Preacher who Praised Bombers Is Among Six Arrested, DAILY MAIL (U.K.), Apr. 25, 2007,
at 20.
79. Sean O’Neill, Muslim Faces Prison over Terror Speeches, TIMES (U.K.), Apr. 18, 2008, at 21.
80. See R v. Malik, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1450 (Eng.); see also S. Chehani Ekaratne, Redundant
Restriction: The U.K.’s Offense of Glorifying Terrorism, 23 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 205, 216–17 (2010)
(describing the Malik case).
81. See Haroon Siddique, ‘Lyrical Terrorist’ Convicted over Hate Records, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Nov. 8,
2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/nov/08/terrorism.world (describing the documents found in
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had written seemingly in praise of terrorist actions. It is not implausible to think the
quasi-religious poetry introduced at trial played a role in her conviction by demonstrating
her mens rea.82
C. Regulatory Actions Based on Religious Speech

Criminal prosecution is not the only way to disrupt or disperse a terrorist conspiracy.
Governments also use noncriminal regulatory regimes such as immigration law, financial
regulation, and legal proscriptions of certain groups. Like their criminal counterparts,
these regulatory actions can turn on religious speech.
American immigration law has long allowed exclusion and deportation on
ideological grounds.83 As a result, immigration law is an attractive prophylactic tool for
government when a terrorism prosecution would otherwise be unavailable. Further, when
prosecutors are unable to secure a conviction, the government can use immigration
powers to achieve the prosecution’s interdiction goal at a lower cost.84 Increasing overlap
between the substantive grounds for deportation and the content of the criminal law
during the past three decades, moreover, has enlarged the substitutability of deportation
for criminal sanctions.85
Amendments to federal immigration law since 1999 expanded terrorism-related
removal grounds and facilitated enforcement actions based on religious expression.86

Malik’s possession).
82. The conviction was later overturned. Lee Glendinning, ‘Lyrical Terrorist’ Has Conviction Quashed,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 17, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/jun/17/uksecurity.ukcrime.
83. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, allowed, inter alia,
the exclusion of any alien “affiliated with groups that advocate World Communism or totalitarian
dictatorship.” Cf. DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN
THE WAR ON TERRORISM 164–67 (2003) (describing litigation in which the Immigration and Nationality
Act, also known as the McCarran–Walter Act, was struck down).
84. In at least one case, a failed prosecution has been followed seriatim by an immigration action. See,
e.g., Elaine Silvestrini, ICE Puts Chill on Megahed Acquittal, TAMPA BAY ONLINE, Apr. 12, 2009,
http://www2.tbo.com/content/2009/apr/12/na-ice-puts-chill-on-megahed-acquittal/ (noting the use of
immigration law to deport Sami al-Hussayen after the failed prosecution of him).
85. See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U.
L. REV. 367, 381 (2006) (describing an “increasing overlap between criminal and immigration law”).
86. For an overview of relevant changes in the immigration statute, see Gerald L. Neuman,
Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 647–48 (2006). At the same time, judicial scrutiny
of immigration law’s workings has diminished. In 1999, the Supreme Court held that “an alien unlawfully
in this country has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a defense against his
deportation.” Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 488 (1999).
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Section 411 of the October 2001 USA PATRIOT Act authorized the government to deny
admission to any alien who had used a “position of prominence within any country to
endorse or espouse terrorist activity” or to “persuade others to support terrorist activity or
a terrorist organization.”87 A 2005 amendment enlarged the scope of this provision to
include circumstances in which the Attorney General has a reasonable basis to believe an
individual is engaged in, or likely to engage in, terrorist activity or that the individual
endorses or espouses terrorist activity.88 This amendment empowers immigration officials
to make predictive judgments about individuals based on inferences drawn from the
individuals’ religious beliefs or statements. Under an earlier iteration of the provision, the
Department of Homeland Security revoked in 2004 a visa granted to Swiss theologian
Tariq Ramadan, telling journalists that Ramadan had “‘used a position of prominence . . .
to endorse or espouse terrorist activity.’”89 Ramadan’s critics outside government also
cited his doctrinal writings to justify the exclusion decision.90
In the United Kingdom, immigration authorities scrutinize foreign imams’ religious
views before admitting them into the country.91 In November 2003, British immigration
authorities detained a senior Deobandi cleric, Yusuf Motala, and questioned him
extensively about “the curricula of his seminaries, his views on aspects of Islam and

87. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411, 115 Stat. 272, 346.
88. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 103, 119 Stat. 302, 306–07 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i) (2006)).
89. Pamela Constable, Divisive Scholar Draws Parallels Between Islam and Democracy, WASH. POST,
Apr. 11, 2007, at B6; see also ACLU, THE EXCLUDED: IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION AND THE WAR OF IDEAS
11 (2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/the_excluded_report.pdf (noting that
Ramadan’s exclusion had initially been justified by the government on the ground that he “endorsed or
espoused terrorism”). Ramadan’s exclusion was later justified under a different statutory provision. See
Olivier Guitta, The State Dept. Was Right, WEEKLY STANDARD, Oct. 16, 2006,
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/800naxnt.asp
(“[T]he
State
Department denied a visa to Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan on the grounds that he had contributed around
600 euros to a French charity classified as a terrorist organization . . . .”).
90. See Guitta, supra note 89 (“Ramadan holds out Islam as the solution to all the problems of Muslim
youth . . . .”). Ramadan himself attributed the exclusion to political differences. See Tariq Ramadan, OpEd., Why I’m Banned in the USA, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2006, at B1 (“I am increasingly convinced that the
Bush administration has barred me for a much simpler reason: It doesn’t care for my political views.”).
Ramadan was subsequently admitted into and entered the United States. See Am. Acad. Religion v.
Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115, 134–39 (2d Cir. 2009) (vacating and remanding the initial refusal based on a
possible procedural flaw in the consular decision); Kirk Semple, At Last Allowed, Muslim Scholar Visits,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2010, at A29.
91. Jonathan Birt, Good Imam, Bad Imam: Civic Religion and National Integration in Britain Post9/11, 96 MUSLIM WORLD 687, 694–95 (2006).
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alleged connections with jihadist groups.”92 Under rules promulgated in the aftermath of
the July 2005 London bus and subway bombings, British authorities have the power to
deport those who “foment, justify or glorify” terrorism.93 After the attacks, deportation
proceedings were initiated against a Jamaican imam, Abdullah el-Faisal, who influenced
one of the July 2005 suicide bombers by arguing after September 2001 that “the Koran
justified attacks on non-Muslims.”94 In August 2005, then-Home Secretary Charles
Clarke also banned Syrian-born cleric Omar Bakri Mohammed from returning to the
United Kingdom on the ground that “his presence is not conducive to the public good.”95
The same month, the government published a list of “Unacceptable Behaviours” that, if
committed, could lead to exclusion or deportation. Items on this list include “public
speaking including preaching; running [an extremist] website,” and expressing
viewpoints that “foster hatred which might lead to inter-community violence in the
UK.”96 Enforcement of such rules means that government officials have to make
decisions about what kinds of religious speech will “foster” hatred or “foment” violence.
In so doing, they must make judgments about how a community of co-religionists will
likely interpret religious speech or doctrine. This plunges officials into the heart of
contested questions of religious epistemology.
The British government has also introduced a scheme of organization proscription on
ideological grounds. After the July 2005 attacks, the British Parliament enacted
legislation allowing the proscription of domestic organizations engaged in “unlawful
glorification of the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or
generally) of acts of terrorism,” and organizations “associated with statements containing
any such glorification.”97 After the publication of cartoons caricaturing religious figures

92. Id. at 698.
93. Ben Saul, Speaking of Terror: Criminalising Incitement to Violence, 28 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 868,
870 (2005).
94. Alan Cowell, Britain Deports Man Accused of Ties to Attacker in ’05 Bombing, N.Y. TIMES,
May 26, 2007, at A7.
95. Alan Travis et al., Clarke Uses ‘Personal Power’ to Ban Bakri from UK, GUARDIAN (U.K.),
Aug. 13, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/aug/13/terrorism.syria?INTCMP=SRCH.
96. COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE UNITED KINGDOM’S STRATEGY 12 (2006),
available at http://www.iwar.org.uk/homesec/resources/uk-threat-level/uk-counterterrorism-strategy.pdf.
97. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 21 (emphasis added). In the same provision, glorification is defined to
“include[] any form of praise or celebration.” Id.; cf. Saul, supra note 93, at 879 (describing a similar
scheme introduced by the Howard government in Australia).
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by the Danish newspaper Jyllens-Posten in September 2005, the British government
outlawed two organizations—al Ghurabaa and al Firquat un-Nassjiyah (also known as the
Saved Sect)—that organized protests at which individual protesters waved death threats
against the cartoonists.98 On issuing the bans, the Home Office explained that both
groups had “disseminate[d] materials that glorify acts of terrorism.”99
D. Conclusion

Pressure to interdict terrorist conspiracies at a safe time and distance before their
completion and a growing concern about homegrown plots create new challenges for law
enforcement in both the United States and the United Kingdom. The most pressing
challenge is the informational asymmetry that characterizes many terrorism
prosecutions.100 Prosecutors bridge this gap by relying on religious speech. It is also
plausible to suppose that religious speech serves a signaling function at an investigative
stage. Not all enforcement actions will end, however, in criminal prosecutions that rely
on religious speech. Hence, looking at prosecutions alone to determine the extent of state
reliance on religious speech likely yields an undercount.
A caveat is warranted here. The phenomenon described here—reliance on religious
speech as a signal in counterterrorism—is not the same as the practice of discriminatory
policing based on racial or religious identity. My narrow claim here is that law
enforcement entities have addressed the uniquely difficult problem of informational
asymmetry in terrorism investigations by turning to religious speech as a plausible signal
of and proxy for terrorist intent. That claim does not in any way rest on the distinct and
different proposition that law enforcement entities in the United States or the United
Kingdom operate on the basis of invidious biases.101 But nor should I be taken to imply

98. Press Release, Home Office, Home Office to Ban Terror Groups (July 17, 2006), available at
http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/press-releases/ban-terror-groups; see also Ian Cobain et al., Reborn
Extremist Sect Had Key Role in London Protest, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 11, 2006, at 14; Neil McKay, How
the Fire Spread, SUNDAY HERALD, Feb. 12, 2006, at 37 (describing the groups’ role in the cartoon
controversy); Alan Travis, Reid Uses New Laws to Ban Two Islamist Groups for ‘Glorifying Terrorism,’
GUARDIAN (U.K.), July 18, 2006, at 9 (reporting on the ban).
99. U.K. HOME OFFICE, PROSCRIBED TERRORIST GROUPS 2–3, 6 (2010), available at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/proscribed-terror-groups/proscribedgroups?view=Binary.
100. See supra subpart II(A).
101. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling Became the Law of the Land: United States v.
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an absence of animus. For the purposes of this Article, I am rather concerned with how
the information-poor environment in which terrorist entities such as al Qaeda operate
pushes law enforcement to use religious speech as a signal, or proxy, for unlawful
intentions.
III. Constitutional Implications of the Use of Religious Speech as a Counterterrorism

Signal
This Part focuses on the central question of constitutional law raised by the policies
described in Part II: Under existing U.S. constitutional doctrine, does law enforcement
reliance on religious speech as a signal in counterterrorism work violate the First
Amendment and in particular its Religion Clauses? First Amendment doctrine recognizes
the possibility of two harms from reliance on religious speech as a signal in
counterterrorism enforcement. First, individuals may experience a chilling effect on
speech and association. Second, religious communities may be burdened by constraints
on their autonomy to debate and cultivate unique, distinctive religious views. This Part
focuses on the second harm, which involves the epistemic autonomy of religious
communities. I argue that current constitutional doctrine provides no constraining
mechanism or remedy in response to those harms. In Lawrence Sager’s phrasing, the
constitutional norms in play here are “underenforced,” so that “only a small part of the
universe of plausible claims . . . is seriously considered by the federal courts.”102 I first
briefly describe two harms and then focus on the doctrinal protection of the epistemic
autonomy interest. I conclude that the formal doctrine offers few protective resources for
this species of religious liberty interest.
A. How Does the Signaling Function of Religious Speech Harm First Amendment

Interests?
Government use of religious speech as a signal in domestic counterterrorism
impinges on First Amendment interests in two ways. One implicates individual interests;

Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J.
1005, 1035–36 (2010) (analyzing the “[r]esurgence” of racial profiling in counterterrorism, based largely
on law enforcement’s biases against individuals who appear to be Arab).
102. Sager, supra note 19, at 1216.
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the other concerns a collective interest of religious communities in epistemic autonomy,
i.e., the freedom to define and revise faith understandings and doctrine without
interference by the state.
First, government’s reliance on religious speech directly affects individuals. By
relying on religious speech as a basis for discerning private actors who merit punishment,
government raises the public cost of using religious speech (i.e., by increasing the
possibility of being targeted for investigation on the basis of that speech). Hence, it
creates an incentive to use nonreligious speech. Reliance on religious speech as a signal
has the potential as a result to chill individuals’ constitutionally protected speech.
Because that speech concerns matters at the core of many individuals’ understanding of
their identity, a chilling effect will impinge on “individual autonomy understood as the
practical power to choose one’s ends”103 that is at the heart of some conceptions of the
speech and association components of the First Amendment.
An additional stigmatic harm might be imagined. It is plausible that government
reliance on religious speech in counterterrorism also could inflict “pervasive dignitary
and stigmatic harms”104 on individuals by sending the message that members of a
minority religious group are “presumptively disloyal and unworthy of empathy”105 and
by “discrediting [its members’] participation in civil culture” through claims framed in
religious terms.106
Yet if the constitutional significance of religious speech’s signaling function were
exhausted by its impact upon individuals targeted for enforcement actions, then the
constitutional costs would seem to be few. No general rule bars the government from
using speech as evidence of either actus reus or mens rea of a criminal offense.107 A
religious element in speech, the Supreme Court has instructed, does not change this
103. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144,
178 (2003).
104. Murad Hussein, Note, Defending the Faithful: Speaking the Language of Group Harm in Free
Exercise Challenges to Counterterrorism Profiling, 117 YALE L.J. 920, 926 (2008).
105. Id. at 938.
106. Id.
107. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993) (“The First Amendment . . . does not prohibit
the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent.”); KENT
GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME & THE USES OF LANGUAGE 79–126 (1989) (discussing agreements to
commit crimes, criminal threats, and inducements to crime). But see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
581–91 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (expressing doubt that speech should be treated as an actus reus).
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analysis.108 Any infringement of religious liberty would be an incidental byproduct of an
otherwise legitimate enforcement action that triggers no free exercise concern. Further,
reliance on religious speech as a signal in domestic counterterrorism entails no outright
ban or direct burden on speech, no viewpoint-based distinction, and no content-based
regulation.109 The individual constitutional interests burdened by the use of religious
speech as a counterterrorism signal thus seem at least tolerable given the magnitude of
the countervailing state interest.
But the second harm to First Amendment interests, while more unusual, raises
complex questions with potentially greater normative heft. This second harm sounds in
the Religion Clauses rather than the free speech part of the First Amendment. It is more
unusual because the affected interest (in epistemic autonomy) belongs to groups, rather
than individuals, and is linked less directly to governmental reliance on religious speech.
The interest at stake here is the shared, collective interest that a religious community has
in determining the content and direction of its religious beliefs without interference by
the government. Call this the interest that a religious community has in epistemic
autonomy.
Religious communities have a collective interest in epistemic autonomy. This
encompasses control over the form and content of canonical religious texts such as the
Bible, a point of considerable controversy in the history of American schooling.110 It
entails the right of a religious community to form and revise collective understandings of
its own faith, free of state interference. And it may reach the right of minority
communities to protect their children from the perceived corrupting influences of public

108. See Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 109 (1952)
(“Legislative power to punish subversive action cannot be doubted. If such action should be actually
attempted by a cleric, neither his robe nor his pulpit would be a defense.”).
109. Cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (upholding basic
rights of the press to prevail over a statute supposedly permitting prior restraint); Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of
content discrimination.”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (recognizing content-based
regulations of speech as “presumptively invalid”).
110. Catholics and Protestants in the United States have long clashed over the proper translation of the
Bible. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 279, 299–300 (2001). Even the text of the Ten Commandments is subject to debate. See Van Orden v.
Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 717–18 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“There are many distinctive versions of the
Decalogue, ascribed to by different religions and even different denominations within a particular faith; to a
pious and learned observer, these differences may be of enormous religious significance.”).
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education.111 Epistemic autonomy, while somewhat conceptually elusive, has in other
words been a central battlefield for religious liberty in the American twentieth century.
State reliance on religious speech as a signal in domestic counterterrorism imperils
the epistemic autonomy of certain religious communities. When the government, in the
course of a criminal or immigration proceeding, takes sides about the meaning of a
religious text, or when it takes a position about the entailments of some religious doctrine
for practical political action, it places a thumb on the scales of internal debate within the
religious community. It may in effect endorse one side’s claims over another’s in a way
that affects doctrinal development and changes the social meaning of a religious term.112
Or by indicating that some dogma or ideas will be treated as almost per se evidence of
illegal intentions—as the prayer on Hayat’s throat note was—the government may close
off possible avenues of debate. In so intervening, the state is of course not claiming an
authoritative power to resolve hermeneutical disputes. Rather, the state is distorting the
free evolution of religious thought within a community by changing the costs and
benefits of certain doctrinal moves.
An illustration may be helpful here. Consider again the reception of Hamid Hayat’s
trial and conviction among his co-religionists in California. Hayat’s trial was closely
followed by his co-religionists. According to one Sacramento-based Muslim community
activist, “[t]he entire Muslim community in Lodi is watching [the legal proceedings].”113
After having followed Hayat’s trial and conviction, Muslims in Southern California knew
that federal law enforcement authorities treated the throat note prayer as evidence of
violent intent. As a result, they had a pro tanto reason not to use that prayer, whether or
not they accepted the Government’s interpretation of it as an endorsement of violence.
Indeed that prayer is also commonly worn in the form of a talisman to ward off daily
111. For Catholic concerns along these lines, see Sarah Barrington Gordon, “Free” Religion and
“Captive” Schools: Protestants, Catholics, and Education, 1945–1965, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1177, 1183
(2007). For Evangelical concerns, see Stanley Fish, Children and the First Amendment, 29 CONN. L. REV.
883, 886–88 (1997) (chronicling the case of Mozert v. Hawkins, 582 F. Supp. 201 (E.D. Tenn. 1984), rev’d,
827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), in which an Evangelical Christian mother sued to prevent her child from
being made to read a textbook that exposed readers to a variety of religious beliefs).
112. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 951 (1995)
(“Any society or social context has what I call here social meanings—the semiotic content attached to
various actions, or inactions, or statuses, within a particular context.”).
113. Carolyn Marshall, 24-Year Term for Californian in Terrorism Training Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 2007, at A20.
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misfortune.114 (The Government’s trial witness, in other words, erred seriously in his
reading.)115 Notwithstanding this error, and without claiming power to issue an
authoritative interpretation, the state had signaled strongly to Hayat’s co-religionists that
the prayer would be deemed evidence of violent intent.
Another illustration—where the Government did not err in its interpretation—is the
Virginia case.116 When the federal government used al-Timimi’s sermons as evidence of
his dangerousness, his conviction catalyzed changes to the way that Muslims in Northern
Virginia self-identified and expressed their identity. According to one account, alTimimi’s arrest and conviction seeded a “sense of beleaguerment among many Muslims
in the Washington area . . . particularly” among groups close to al-Timimi’s mosque,
disarming them in ongoing doctrinal fights with competing sectarian factions.117 A
Muslim community activist from that area told a journalist, “In the past, people would
say, ‘I’m Salafi’ [al-Timimi’s denomination]. Now, I never encounter people who say
that.”118 That is, the lesson of the al-Timimi trial for Virginia Muslims was that to call
oneself a “Salafi” was to invite government scrutiny and possibly worse. The al-Timimi
case suggests that a religious community can be affected by the government’s use of
religious speech as a signal whether or not the interpretation is erroneous.
B. Constitutional Protection of Religious Epistemic Autonomy

The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the epistemic autonomy interest of religious
communities in two strands of often-overlooked precedent. In those lines of cases, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment to shelter a
religious community’s interest in defining and revising its own understanding of dogma
114. See Waldman, supra note 7, at 90 (noting the jury foreman’s skepticism of the testimony of a
University of Oregon professor “who had testified that Pakistanis commonly carry a [Muslim talisman
called a] tawiz to ward off evil, much the way Jews place a mezuzah outside their door”).
115. The prosecution’s specific interpretation of the throat note was at a minimum highly questionable.
According to several experts, it was in fact “a traditional supplication . . . reported to have been said by the
Prophet [Mohammad] when he feared harm from a group of people.” Id. In her excellent reporting on the
trial, Amy Waldman sought views from two experts (Bernard Haykel and Ingrid Mattson) and a Pakistani
New York Times reporter based in Islamabad and consulted published and online collections of traditional
Islamic prayers. All confirmed that the prosecution’s interpretation was incorrect.
116. See supra notes 65–71 and accompanying text.
117. Caryle Murphy, For Conservative Muslims, Goal of Isolation a Challenge, WASH. POST, Sept. 5,
2006, at A1.
118. Id.
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and doctrine and in fashioning its own normative commitments and epistemic criteria.
But these cases are now dated. Religion Clause doctrine has shifted. Even though
precedent on epistemic autonomy has not formally been revisited, the question may fairly
be asked: Do these precedents still imply judicial protection for religious communities’
free normative development? Or are they outmoded outliers of another era, yielding little
comfort or shelter from contemporary pressures on First Amendment values?
1. The Protection of Epistemic Autonomy Under the Religion Clauses.—The two

lines of Religion Clause precedent both arise out of disputed dispositions of religious
institutions’ property after a schism had ruptured an originally unitary church. Both lines
of cases rely upon Establishment Clause and also Free Exercise Clause concerns.
In the first set of cases, the Court cautioned against inquiries into the fidelity of one
side or another to original church doctrine. It did so in terms anticipating and prefiguring
a later Establishment Clause rule against state “endorsement” of certain religious
positions.119 This anti-endorsement strand of religious epistemic autonomy emerged first
in nineteenth-century case law concerning church property division. A clear prohibition
on state endorsement of religious orthodoxy emerged only after 1950.
In the 1871 case Watson v. Jones,120 the Court intimated a concern for epistemic
autonomy when it delineated a three-part framework for resolving disputes about the
disposition of church property.121 First, if a case involved an express trust that stipulated
fidelity to church doctrine, that trust would be enforced.122 Second, in cases concerned
with independent congregations that lacked hierarchal arrangements, “the rights of such
bodies . . . [would] be determined by the ordinary principles which govern voluntary

119. The idea of endorsement was first suggested by Justice O’Connor and later picked up by other
Justices. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (asking whether the state
had impermissibly “sen[t] a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of
the political community”); see also Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
573, 592–94 (1989) (engaging in an endorsement analysis based on Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in
Lynch). Justice O’Connor later explained that the endorsement analysis is applied from the perspective of a
“reasonable observer.” Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779–80 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
120. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
121. Id. at 722–28.
122. Id. at 722.
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associations.”123 Finally, the Court explained that in cases involving hierarchical
churches, the decision of the “highest of . . . church judicatories” would be respected.124
Sounding constitutional overtones, the Court explained that these three options protected
“the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious principle,
and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and
property.”125
Yet within a year of Watson, the Court was meddling again in the internal affairs of
religious bodies. It first cautioned that judicial respect for churches’ internal decision
making would be obtained only if a church abided by its own procedures.126 In 1929, the
Court identified three exceptions to Watson for “fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness.”127 In
practical effect, these exceptions invited lower tribunals to interrogate churches’ internal
decision making based on allegations that a decision was “arbitrary” or inconsistent
without guidance as to how that standard would be applied to the peculiar context of
religious associations. The invitation was not ignored.128
Only after World War II did the Court revisit its conflicting instructions. In cases
decided in 1952 and 1960, the Court created a zone of decisional autonomy for
ecclesiastical bodies. In those cases, it held that neither New York’s legislature nor its
courts could displace the governing body of the Russian Orthodox Church based on
allegations that the latter had fallen under Soviet control.129 In 1969, the Court
123. Id. at 725.
124. Id. at 727; see also 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND
FAIRNESS 263–65 (2006) (discussing the Court’s grouping of questions concerning the rights to church
properties into three categories, including a category for when a congregation is subordinate to a larger
church organization); Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious
Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1847–52 (1998) (describing Watson comprehensively).
125. Watson, 80 U.S. at 728.
126. See, e.g., Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 140 (1872) (holding that a majority rule
would be followed for congregational churches provided that the majority “adhere to the organization and
to the doctrines” of the church).
127. Gonzales v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1929).
128. See, e.g., Brundage v. Deardorf, 55 F. 839, 847–48 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1893) (stating that only “a
bona fide decision” of an ecclesiastical tribunal would be recognized); Note, Judicial Intervention in
Church Property Disputes—Some Constitutional Considerations, 74 YALE L.J. 1113, 1119 n.32 (1965)
(collecting cases).
129. For legislatures, see Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344
U.S. 94, 120–21 (1952) (“Even in those cases when the property right follows as an incident from decisions
of the church custom or law on ecclesiastical issues, the church rule controls.”). For courts, see Kreshik v.
Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 363 U.S. 190, 190–91 (1960) (per curiam)
(holding that a state court could not deny a “right conferred under canon law”).
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invalidated a Georgia state court decision because the state tribunal had relied on a state
law rule that church property remained in the trust of a larger ecclesiastical entity
provided that the entity did not “depart substantially from prior doctrine.”130 Recognizing
the potential collision between arbitrariness review and desire to show respect for the
unpredictable pathways of religious thinking, the Court opted for the latter. In 1976, the
Court held that courts could not review ecclesiastical authorities’ decisions to determine
whether they were “arbitrary.”131 The Court rested this judgment on the perceived risk
that state intervention might “inhibit[] the free development of religious doctrine” by
placing a thumb on the scales of doctrinal debate.132
Like the endorsement test subsequently to be developed by Justice O’Connor, the
final version of this rule aimed at barring the state from “send[ing] a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community.”133 Whereas the church property cases concerned the play of
factions within a religious community, Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test focused on
the interaction of religious minorities with the larger society. Both church-property cases
and the endorsement rule, nevertheless, have the purpose and effect of keeping the state
clear of intramural sectarian disputes and preserving a communal right to religious selfdetermination.
The second relevant line of cases under the Religion Clauses prohibits judicial
inquiry into religious doctrine. Again, this line of cases anticipates an idea in later

130. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450
(1969). Akin to the arbitrariness exception, the “departure-from-doctrine” rule invited judicial scrutiny into
church doctrine. Id.
131. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 712–16 (1976). While courts can still
inquire into “fraud” or “collusion,” the continuing validity of these exceptions to the general rule of
noninquiry into church decision making is uncertain. See Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of
the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM.
L. REV. 1373, 1397 (1981) (citing cases where state courts relying on fraud exceptions were reversed and
commenting that such exceptions do not fit the Court’s broad rationale).
132. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 449.
133. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also McCreary Cnty.
v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860–61 (2005) (describing a showing of government purpose to favor one
religion over another or adherence to religion generally as a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders); supra note 119.
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Establishment

Clause

jurisprudence—the

“entanglement”

test.134

This

“anti-

entanglement” rule differs from the anti-endorsement strand of church-property case law
because it concerns the method and not the consequence of judicial inquiry.135 That is, it
does not speak to the results or effects of state action. Rather it limits the manner in
which the state—a court or another decision maker—may resolve a dispute linked to the
epistemic life of a religious community.
This second line of precedent also emerged out of church-property disputes.136 In
1969, the Court had invalidated the Georgia state law rule that a general church held a
local church’s property in implicit trust “on the sole condition that the general church
adhere to its tenets of faith and practice existing at the time of affiliation by the local
churches.”137 In the course of its decision, the Court observed that this test forced “[a]
court . . . of necessity [to] make its own interpretation of the meaning of church doctrine”
by “assessing the relative significance to the religion of the tenets.”138 No constitutionally
permissible space obtained, in the Court’s opinion, for courts to engage in the
“interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the
religion.”139
Seven years later, the Court elaborated on that hint. In a 1976 decision, the Court
squarely prohibited “detailed review” of ecclesiastical decision making in the course of
determining whether a decision was “arbitrary.”140 In language colored by a concern for
religious institutions’ epistemic autonomy, the Court cautioned that the First Amendment
“commits

exclusively

to

the

highest

ecclesiastical

tribunals’”

resolution

of

“quintessentially religious controversies.”141 Both cases tracked concerns expressed in

134. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615–23 (1971) (applying the entanglement test);
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (“Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.”).
135. For instance, the Court has expressed concern that a tax regulation requiring the IRS to
differentiate “secular” from “religious” benefits might lead to entangling inquiries. Hernandez v. Comm’r,
490 U.S. 680, 694 (1989).
136. Entanglement captures at least three different concerns: excessive state aid, excessive surveillance,
and the fostering of divisive political competition on religious lines. Laycock, supra note 131, at 1392–94.
137. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 443.
138. Id. at 450.
139. Id. Justice Brennan referred opaquely to the First Amendment as a source for this rule, citing
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Id. at 449.
140. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 718 (1976).
141. Id. at 720. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull and Serbian Eastern Orthodox were subsequently confirmed
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other Establishment Clause case law about “[t]he prospect of church and state litigating
in court about what does or does not have religious meaning.”142 That concern was one
elaborated and generalized in the anti-entanglement test for Establishment Clause
violations set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman.143 Epistemic autonomy protection, that is,
prefigured the general contours of Religion Clause jurisprudence in more ways than one.
2. The Erosion of Epistemic Autonomy.—These two lines of cases date largely from

the Warren and early Burger courts. But the Court’s view of the Religion Clauses has
changed dramatically since then.144 The changes have undermined the intellectual
foundations of case law protecting epistemic autonomy.145
In its interpretation of both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, the Court
has veered away from treating religion and religious disputation as exceptional human
activities that are unique and beyond the proper purview of state authority. It has also
increasingly resisted the idea that religion warrants separate and special treatment.
Instead it has moved toward a view of religion as singular only because it is historically
vulnerable to invidious discrimination.146 As a result, the Court typically finds no
Religion Clause violation unless religious persons or beliefs are facially singled out for

in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602–06 (1979). See also Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v.
Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (per curiam) (dismissing an appeal because
“the Maryland court’s resolution of the dispute involved no inquiry into religious doctrine”).
142. New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977).
143. See 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (stating that “[a] law may be one ‘respecting’ the [establishment
of religion] while falling short of its total realization” because the concern is to avoid “foster[ing] an
‘excessive government entanglement with religion’” (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1970))).
144. See Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Rehnquist Court, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 146 (2004) (“In a
brief decade and a half, we have moved from expansive readings of both of the religious clauses to narrow
readings of the Free Exercise Clause and of very important aspects of the Establishment Clause.”).
145. I assume here the widely shared view of constitutional doctrine as implementing the Constitution’s
values through a sequence of judicially crafted doctrinal rules that respond to institutional limitations and
changing circumstances. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword:
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1975) (“[A] surprising amount of what passes as
authoritative constitutional ‘interpretation’ is best understood as . . . a substructure of substantive,
procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various
constitutional provisions . . . .”); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 877, 885 (1996) (“[O]ur written constitution has . . . become part of an evolutionary common law
system, and the common law . . . provides the best way to understand the practices of American
constitutional law.”).
146. See Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90
CALIF. L. REV. 673, 694–706 (2002) (chronicling the shift toward minority protection in religious freeexpression cases).
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discriminatory treatment.147 Disparate-effect claims, by contrast, have not fared well. The
emphasis on formal equality leaves less room for concepts of separation or concerns
about epistemic autonomy.
The landmark case of Employment Division v. Smith148 transformed the Free
Exercise Clause’s protection from a right against laws that burden religious liberty to a
rule against facial discrimination.149 In Smith the Court held that neutral laws of general
applicability are valid under the Free Exercise Clause regardless of their burden on
religious liberty.150 In practical effect, Smith established a weak equality rule that is
satisfied in all but the small set of cases in which legislators are foolish enough to flout
facial neutrality (or almost-facial neutrality).151 In most instances, it will be feasible to
mask impermissible motives.
Moreover, the Court’s sensitivity to anti-endorsement and anti-entanglement
concerns has also diminished. Three trends in recent doctrine, palpable largely in
Establishment Clause cases, undermine the claim that state action is unconstitutional if it
impinges on a religious group’s autonomy and communicates a view about internal
doctrinal debates. Coupled with Smith’s relaxed view of Free Exercise protections, these
Establishment Clause trends mark a retreat from vigorous protection of epistemic
religious autonomy.
First, the Court is less sensitive about government action that takes a position on
religious meaning. It is less willing to intervene when the state echoes and endorses a
majoritarian preference on religion. In 2005, for example, when the Court held that a
147. See Nelson Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1264 (2008) (referencing the
general agreement that the government cannot target individual religious groups in regulations, barring
extraordinary circumstances). But cf. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338–39 (1987) (finding an exception to Title VII for religious groups).
148. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
149. Id. at 879; accord Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–
32, 546 (1993) (holding that a “law burdening religious practice that is neither neutral nor of general
application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny”). For early criticism of Smith, see Douglas
Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 10–23; Michael W. McConnell, Religious
Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 138–39 (1992).
150. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882; see also Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 536 (applying this rule).
151. The relevant Supreme Court precedent for this proposition, Lukumi Babalu Aye, is an outlier. In
that case, the social and historical context of the local ordinance at issue could not have been more
thoroughly imbricated with evidence of animus against a classically discrete, insular, and unpopular
minority. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 526–27. The social meaning of a law will not necessarily be so
obvious.
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Texas display of the Decalogue did not violate the Establishment Clause, a plurality of
Justices invoked tradition and history as constitutionally sufficient justifications.152
Allowing inchoate ideas of tradition to trump otherwise applicable Establishment Clause
values allows the state to take sides in important religious disputes if a historically
powerful majority faction endorses it. More generally, support within the Court for
Justice O’Connor’s anti-endorsement test has waned. Commentators criticize it as
analytically incoherent and insufficiently responsive to minority sensitivities.153 Justice
Scalia has already set forth an alternative view whereby government need not remain
neutral between religion and nonreligion but can “acknowledg[e] a single Creator.”154
And a plurality of the Court has recently indicated an openness to some kinds of religious
endorsement on the ground that “[t]he goal of avoiding governmental endorsement does
not require eradication of all religious symbols in the public realm.”155 As the Court
becomes less troubled by the expressive effects of state action on religious matters, it
becomes less likely to take umbrage at the disruption of epistemic autonomy wrought by
counterterrorism enforcement actions.
Second, the Court, in another line of cases, has authorized state-funding mechanisms
that aggregate private choices in ways that set the state’s imprimatur upon one religious
practice or another. In so doing, the Court has created another vehicle for majorities to
give expressive effect to their religious preferences. As a result, it has corroded a little
further the doctrinal grounds for treating incursions on epistemic autonomy as
problematic. In 2002, the Court sanctioned government educational aid to parochial

152. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686–92 (2005) (plurality opinion) (relying on “unbroken
history” as a warrant for display of the Decalogue on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol); see also Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 26–30 (2004) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment)
(arguing that expressive state action constituting “public recognition of our Nation’s religious history and
character” ought to survive an Establishment Clause challenge).
153. See, e.g., Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 695–97 (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing the endorsement
test). In the academic literature, endorsement has critics, see Feldman, supra note 146, at 710–18 (arguing
that endorsement does not protect against certain forms of exclusion but that there is no reason religion
should be singled out for endorsement-related protection), and putative reformers, see Adam Samaha,
Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to Anti-sorting Principles, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 135, 144–58.
154. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 888–94 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1818 (2010) (plurality opinion). But see id. at 1832–33
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (applying the endorsement test). The Court further diluted the endorsement test by
suggesting that “text-based [public] monuments are almost certain to evoke different thoughts and
sentiments in the minds of different observers, and the effect of monuments that do not contain text is likely
to be even more variable.” Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1135 (2009).
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schools on the condition that the aid is “neutral with respect to religion[] and provides
assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to
religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private
choice.”156 Then-Chief Justice Rehnquist explained this result by asserting that
“numerous independent decisions of private individuals” do not add up to any
“imprimatur of government endorsement.”157
But Chief Justice Rehnquist’s analysis is incomplete. By gerrymandering “privatechoice” mechanisms, the state can easily endorse one form of religious practice over
others. The private-choice exception thereby enables state endorsement and entrenchment
of one religious group. Neutrality at the level of individual choice does not entail
neutrality in the treatment of competing religious collectivities. For the state chooses in
which domains—education, health, prison services—private choice will be made
available. And it can use this choice for distributive ends. As Justice Jackson pointed out
in the first case incorporating the Establishment Clause against the states, state funding
for religious educational institutions predictably aids certain faiths because only some
sects maintain schools.158 A foreseeable result is state aid predictably flowing to some
religious organizations, which can develop economies of scale, secure a larger market
share of the social service in question (e.g., education), and discourage other faith groups
from entering the same market.159 Deciding to introduce vouchers for schooling but not
health care, hence, aids certain sects over others. The possibility of private choice is not
neutral as between religions. But the Court to date has declined to register the risk that
156. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793,
809–10 (2000) (plurality opinion) (stating that neutrality toward religious groups is required to ensure that
no endorsement of religion has occurred).
157. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655.
158. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 20 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that an aid
program discriminated because the New Jersey scheme in question “authorize[d] disbursement of . . .
taxpayer’s money . . . to those who attend public schools and Catholic schools”). The extent to which
school vouchers, for example, can yield predictable effects over time is debated. See Vincent Blasi,
Vouchers and Steering, 18 J.L. & POL. 607, 619–20 (2002) (drawing attention to the differing opinions
about the long-term effects of vouchers on schools’ independence). From early in the twentieth century, the
no-aid principle was intended to control distributional outcomes and to stop financial distributions to
Catholics. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 110, at 312–17 (describing the evolution of Protestant and
Jewish opposition to distributions to Catholics and the general public secularist interest in limiting
distributions in order to protect public education).
159. See Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on
Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 141–45 (1996) (describing cooperation–defection differential
between membership and nonmembership in religious groups and noting ways the state can modify it).
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private-choice mechanisms alter the market in religious beliefs.160 Nor is it willing to
inquire into how a private-choice scheme might be intentionally constructed so as to
advantage one sect over others.161
Finally, although entanglement was initially one of three tests for Establishment
Clause violations,162 the Court no longer applies a freestanding entanglement test.163 In
Agostini v. Felton,164 the Court assimilated “entanglement” into its analysis of a law’s
effect.165 Entanglement is now a second-order justification for declining to scrutinize
closely a sectarian recipient of state funds and hence a rationale for relaxing the judicial
regulation of private-choice programs recently endorsed by the Court.166 The Court has
also rejected challenges to substantial regulation of religious entities’ internal affairs in
the course of general regulatory measures or the disbursement of special benefits.167
160. In Zelman, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the risk that financial incentives might skew a
program toward religious schools but concluded that so long as “neutral, secular” criteria were used no
constitutional problem obtained. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653–54 & n.3 (noting in addition that the
Cleveland voucher program “in fact create[d] financial disincentives for religious schools,” which received
less funding than community or magnet schools).
161. At the time of this writing, the Supreme Court has sub judice a challenge to an Arizona school
voucher system that raises a version of this concern. See Garriott v. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 3324 (2010); Ariz.
Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 3350 (2010) (both granting writ of certiorari).
162. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971); see also Kenneth F. Ripple, The Entanglement
Test of the Religion Clauses—A Ten Year Assessment, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1195, 1197–98 (1980) (noting that
entanglement was first articulated in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), but only designated as
a separate Establishment Clause test in Lemon).
163. For past applications of entanglement, see, for example, New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S.
125, 133 (1977), and Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 749–60 (1976).
164. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
165. Id. at 232–33. Arguably, the end was visible earlier. See Ripple, supra note 162, at 1208–14.
Agostini abandoned the idea that a prohibition on entanglement reflected a value distinct from the no-aid
and no-harm elements of the Establishment Clause. Justice Souter commented that excessive focus on
entanglement in Aguilar “obscured” constitutionally salient facts. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 242 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
166. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (plurality opinion) (stating that “inquiry into the
[state aid] recipient’s religious views . . . is not only unnecessary but also offensive” because “courts should
refrain from trolling through a person’s or institution’s religious beliefs”). The Mitchell plurality picked up
a thread initially developed in cases concerning property-tax exceptions and aid to tertiary educational
institutions. See Roemer, 426 U.S. at 748 n.15 (“The importance of avoiding persistent and potentially
frictional contact between governmental and religious authorities is such that it has been held to justify the
extension, rather than the withholding, of certain benefits to religious organizations.”); Walz, 397 U.S. at
691–92 & n.12 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that state cessation of exemptions “might conflict with the
demands of the Free Exercise Clause”).
167. See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 394–95 (1990)
(holding that the administration and collection of a sales tax is not entangling); Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490
U.S. 680, 696–97 (1989) (holding that the monitoring of a tax benefit is not entangling); Tony & Susan
Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305–06 (1985) (holding that the record-keeping
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act are not entangling).
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By contrast, judicial inquiry into religious belief is now commonplace. Under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), courts must ascertain what constitutes a
“substantial[] burden” on a person’s “exercise of religion.”168 This test means that RFRA
cases plunge courts into religious exegesis.169 “[T]heological questions are begged
throughout the testimony and opinions” in RFRA cases.170 And judges “confidently
assert[] the entire and complete right of every American to believe as she or he chooses
while at the same time thoroughly enjoying arbitrating among competing views.”171 The
mere existence of the RFRA dilutes the force of entanglement concerns because it makes
entanglements a routine part of federal court litigation notionally aimed at protecting
religious liberty. Courts are becoming acclimatized to such entanglement, which
obviously no longer provides an independent ground for invalidity on constitutional
grounds. Rather, entanglement merely functions as a supernumerary factor in a
constitutional calculus driven by extrinsic considerations.
C. Conclusion

This Part began by identifying two constitutional harms to individuals and religious
communities respectively from the government’s reliance on religious speech as a signal
in counterterrorism policing. It argued that these harms are plausibly at stake each time
the federal government relies on religious speech as a signal in counterterrorism.
Nevertheless, the individual harm, which takes the form of a chilling effect and an
incursion on individual dignity, is not a significant marginal cost beyond the necessary
expenditures of a criminal prosecution or other enforcement action. By contrast, the
impact on a religious community’s interest in epistemic autonomy—i.e., free
development of norms and beliefs independent of state interference—could be
168. 42 U.S.C § 2000bb-1 (2006); see also id. § 2000cc-5(7) (providing that a practice need not be
“central to” a religion to be an “exercise of religion”). A unanimous Supreme Court endorsed this test in
2006 as applied to the federal government. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal,
546 U.S. 418, 424 & n.1 (2006).
169. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Judging Religion, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 444–49 (1998) [hereinafter
Sullivan, Judging Religion]. Sullivan argues for “the impossibility of fairly delimiting the contours of
contemporary religious life” in light of the thick multitude of localized religious “folkways” that
characterize religious life in the United States. WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 146, 153 (2005) [hereinafter SULLIVAN, IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM].
170. Sullivan, Judging Religion, supra note 169, at 448–49.
171. SULLIVAN, IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 169, at 6; accord Sullivan, Judging
Religion, supra note 169, at 448–49.
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substantial. Religion Clause doctrine, developed first in cases concerning the state’s
treatment of religious property, recognizes and protects this epistemic autonomy interest.
But that doctrine has been corroded by changes in Religion Clause doctrine. Epistemic
autonomy is now unlikely to command substantial respect or protection in the federal
courts. The government has little reason to factor in the costs to free speech or religious
autonomy interests when it designs its policy responses to domestic terrorism.
This is not an unfamiliar result. Doctrine falls short of full specification or protection
of constitutional norms for many reasons,172 including a Thayerian respect for legislative
judgment or other “institutional concerns.”173 More importantly, the result of the analysis
of this Part accords with the general approach taken by courts to constitutional rights
imperiled by novel security policies adopted in the wake of the September 11 attacks.
Courts have not emerged as robust defenders of individual liberties post-9/11. Even in
areas in which judicial pushback has been seemingly robust, such as in the exercise of
habeas corpus jurisdiction, the Supreme Court’s position may amount to more rhetoric
than substance.174 In part, this may be because the Court has long been reluctant to
regulate investigatory, prosecutorial, and immigration discretion, even when core
constitutional liberty interests are at issue.175 Confrontations with law enforcement tend
to be costly for the court’s public reputation.176 And these costs will be especially high in
the wake of 9/11.
172. But see Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
857, 924 (1999) (arguing for a theory of “remedial equilibration” that “leaves no room for a distinction
between the abstract, analytic definitions of constitutional rights and remedial concerns that prevent courts
from enforcing those rights to their ‘true’ limits”).
173. Sager, supra note 19, at 1222–27.
174. See Aziz Z. Huq, What Good Is Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385, 431 (2010) (questioning the
effect of the Supreme Court’s interventions related to Guantanamo).
175. See, e.g., Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 260 (2006) (holding that, for a retaliatory-prosecution
case, once a claimant has made a prima facie showing of retaliatory harm, if the defendant official can
show that “retaliation was not the but-for cause of the discharge, the claim fails for lack of causal
connection between unconstitutional motive and resulting harm, despite proof of some retaliatory animus in
the official’s mind”); Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 488 (1999) (holding
that the doctrine of constitutional doubt does not require that 28 U.S.C. § 1252(g) be interpreted to permit
immediate review of a respondent’s selective-enforcement claim); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.
456, 462 (1996) (holding that Rule 16(a)(1)(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure does not require
the government to permit discovery of documents material to the “defense” of a selective-prosecution
claim).
176. For example, the Warren Court’s criminal procedure cases provided a centerpiece for Richard
Nixon’s presidential campaign, which in turn led to a change in the Court’s personnel and thus direction.
See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 410 (2002).
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Further, judicial responses to national security have not been acoustically separated
from other bodies of law. “[T]here is nothing sui generis” about the federal bench’s
responses to post-9/11 security policies.177 Judicial responses to post-9/11 policies echo
federal courts’ approaches to other complex state institutions with rights implications.178
At the same time, the increasing concern for security bleeds over into other doctrinal
areas, weakening rights protections that are only tangentially related to terrorism risk.179
Consider the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In recent cases, the Court
has made it easier for law enforcement to demand identification180 and to secure waivers
of the right in custodial interrogations.181 By extension, it might be predicted that the
judicial response to 9/11 will only weaken religious liberty interests.
Finally, there is little public or political pressure on the courts to recognize and
remedy harms from the signaling function of religious speech. Public concern about
counterterrorism law enforcement (to the extent that it exists) generally focuses on
prosecutorial or enforcement actions that discriminate on racial or religious grounds.182
Discriminatory enforcement and profiling are familiar and resonant criticisms of
American law enforcement.183 They are politically potent and recognizable, albeit
intractable.184 By contrast, the effects of using religious speech as a signal in
counterterrorism enforcement are neither easy to identify nor plainly visible. The practice
is partially buried in enforcement protocols. It generally comes to public attention only
sporadically in geographically and temporally dispersed criminal trials. Reliance on
177. Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 226.
178. Id. at 257–65.
179. See, e.g., id. at 267–72 (discussing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), as an example of the
impact of security concerns on transsubstantive rules, such as civil pleading requirements).
180. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 190–91 (2004) (upholding a state
statute requiring a person stopped by the police to produce identification documents).
181. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2262–63 (2010) (finding a waiver of the right against
self-incrimination based on a one-word answer given after two hours and forty-five minutes of silence in
the face of questions).
182. See Gross & Livingston, supra note 4, at 1415 (defining “racial profiling”—at least the kind that
provokes public outrage—as “whenever a law enforcement officer questions, stops, arrests, searches, or
otherwise investigates a person” because of his or her racial or ethnic background).
183. See, e.g., Michael R. Smith, Depoliticizing Racial Profiling: Suggestions for the Limited Use and
Management of Race in Police Decision-Making, 15 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 219, 219 (2005)
(highlighting the growth of the term racial profiling from “a term virtually unheard of five years ago” to a
“part of the national lexicon”).
184. The Hayat case was criticized by the Muslim community of Lodi, California, where Hayat lived,
as an instance of discrimination—not as a failure of interpretation. MacFarquhar, supra note 39.
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religious speech as a signal in counterterrorism is as a result unlikely to precipitate public
outrage or pressure for reform either by legislation or through interest-group litigation.185
Whatever harm flows from the practice will instead be externalized onto the relevant
minority religious community.186
IV. Selecting the Optimal Signal for Domestic Counterterrorism

Government recourse to religious speech as a proxy in domestic counterterrorism
may not collide with constitutional doctrine, but does it provide an efficient signaling
mechanism? This Part switches from a legal, doctrinal lens to an institutional- and policydesign inquiry. It considers whether law enforcement entities indeed have lighted on the
optimal signal for their aims. Recall that prosecutors and police turned to religious speech
relatively quickly after 9/11.187 To minimize search time and costs, they may have
grasped the most readily available, and the most obvious signal. If executive officials
came to rely on religious speech by default as the most obvious tool at hand, then
officials may not have considered the full range of possible signaling options. Moreover,
legislators and executive officials did not benefit from the new empirical research into the
dynamics of terrorism that emerged after 9/11. At a minimum, therefore, the
circumstances under which religious speech was adopted as a signaling device should
counsel for caution. Religious speech may not in fact be the most efficient signal for
resolving epistemic uncertainties in domestic counterterrorism.
This Part analyzes two reasons for questioning reliance on the signaling function of
religious speech. It further suggests that governments may be better off eschewing such
reliance and turning instead to a closer study of suspects’ associations to resolve the
185. Commentators from across the political spectrum noted the lack of public reaction to the trial of
Ali al-Timimi. See, e.g., Debra Erdley, Al-Timimi Verdict Turning Point in Legal War on Terror, TRIBLIVE
NEWS, May 1, 2005, http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s_329818.html (quoting a defense
attorney in saying that the Muslim community “seem[s] resigned to what’s going on” and that they no
longer expect fair trials); Daniel Pipes, Convicting [Ali al-Timimi,] the “Paintball Sheikh,”
DANIELPIPES.COM (May 2, 2005), http://www.danielpipes.org/2579/convicting-ali-al-timimi-the-paintballsheikh (observing that “the mainstream media stayed resolutely away from the case”).
186. See supra notes 104–108 and accompanying text; cf. Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Racial Profiling of
African-American Males: Stopped, Searched, and Stripped of Constitutional Protection, 38 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 439, 459 n.125 (2004) (summarizing congressional findings that racial profiling causes members of
minority communities to “experience fear, anxiety, humiliation, anger, resentment, and cynicism when they
are unjustifiably treated as criminal suspects”).
187. See supra Part II.
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signaling problem. The first reason is institutional: Government interpretation of religious
speech is likely to be characterized by a high error rate because of the relative lack of
institutional knowledge, the predictable incentives of law enforcement officials, and the
semantic complexity of religious speech. The discrete interpretative error manifested in
Hayat’s case,188 that is, is probably not an outlier.
Second, religious speech may not, in any event, be the optimal signal for terrorism—
association may be a better signal. There is a rich and increasingly sophisticated
empirical literature about terrorism that casts some light on the signaling question. It
suggests that religious speech or conduct plays only a tangential role in the etiology of
terrorism. Its inconsistent incidence in terrorism cases provides scant basis for inferring
the correlation that current government practice presupposes. To the contrary, the
empirical and social science literature suggests that a terrorist’s path generally passes
through what Louise Richardson calls a “complicit surround”:189 an insular group with
distinctive, even idiosyncratic, normative and ethical characteristics that influence the
individual turn to political violence. There is surprising convergence on this finding.
While its validity should remain open to new challenges based on new empirical
evidence, there is sufficient consensus in the literature to suggest that it is certain forms
of association, and not religious speech, that will be correlated with terrorism. At a
minimum, this casts current counterterrorism practice into doubt. Moreover, it suggests
that law enforcement should reorient toward the mapping and understanding of social
networks and away from a preoccupation with religious speech. This Part concludes by
considering what it would entail for law enforcement entities to retool their reliance on
religious speech as a signal in counterterrorism.
A. The Error Rate in Current Signaling Practice

Even if religious speech provides an accurate signal for counterterrorism, it may be
better for the state to use a different signal. This will be the case if the government cannot
operationalize the correlation between religious speech and risk. Indeed, it is likely that
the government will have high error rates in handling religious speech for three separate
188. See supra notes 38–57 and accompanying text.
189. LOUISE RICHARDSON, WHAT TERRORISTS WANT: UNDERSTANDING THE ENEMY, CONTAINING THE
THREAT 49 (2006).
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reasons. First, religious speech is more complex and liable to misunderstanding than
other nonreligious discourses. Second, in the American context there has been little state
investment in developing a competency in religious interpretation. To the contrary,
constitutional theorists and scholars have long insisted on the incompetence of the state in
religious matters, providing an affirmative reason for not investing in such expertise. By
now, this may have become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Finally, the distribution of
incentives within policing and prosecutorial institutions will predictably increase the rate
of error. These three reasons suggest that religious speech may not be an optimal signal
for our government even if it might be an effective tool in the hands of some ideal
government.
First, the risk of interpretive error is especially high with respect to religious speech
because of its origins and nature. In the three main monotheistic faiths, most religious
texts, doctrine, and dogma have survived centuries or more. Over extended use in
different cultural and historical circumstances, they have accrued multiple and potentially
inconsistent meanings. It is possible that religious texts must be especially open textured
and receptive to reinterpretation and reappropriation if they are to maintain their
relevance through changing times (because if they are not, they fall out of use).190 That is,
there may be a selection effect that favors hermeneutic malleability. Even without
adopting an ambitious account of religious texts’ evolution, it still seems plausible to
posit that as a general matter, religious texts are likely to be more semantically elastic
than the mine run of normative or political vocabulary.
By way of example, consider the word jihad.191 An Arabic word literally meaning
“striving,” the term jihad is used in the Koran to refer in some places “to disputation and
efforts made for the sake of God and in his cause” and, in other places, to the conduct of
war related to the exercise of a communal duty.192 In the seventh century, the term

190. Cf. Michael Pye, Problems of Method in the Interpretation of Religion, 1 JAPANESE J. RELIGIOUS
STUD. 107, 120–21 (1974) (“All sophisticated religions experience some degree of tension between the
doctrinal norms and formulations which they have inherited and the changing needs of the times. This
results in a constant string of new interpretations.”).
191. See MICHAEL BONNER, JIHAD IN ISLAMIC HISTORY: DOCTRINES AND PRACTICE 1–2 (2006)
(summarizing the different interpretations of the word).
192. Id. at 2, 21; see also Fred M. Donner, The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War (“The Qur’an
makes . . . frequent reference to ‘struggle’ or striving[] (jihad and other derivations), by which physical
confrontation or fighting appears often—but not always—to be intended.”), in JUST WAR AND JIHAD:
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evolved into a referent for a larger body of legal doctrine analogous to jus in bello and jus
ad bellum in the Western legal tradition.193 More modern jurists, however, propounded
another, much more expansive, understanding of jihad to justify terrorism.194 They draw
on another distinctive strand of theological thought beginning with the thirteenth century
Damascus-based scholar Taqī-d-dīn Ahmad ibn-Taymiyya.195 By contrast, yet another
denomination, the ascetic Sufi tradition, uses the term “greater Holy War” (i.e., jihad) to
describe the “constant struggle against the nafs, the ‘soul’—the lower self, the base
instincts.”196 However it is generally used now, the term jihad clearly has a rich history
that lends itself to more than one interpretation.
The second reason to posit that error rates may be high is related to the first: There is
a long tradition in American constitutional law warning that the state is especially likely
to make mistakes when it interprets religious texts. Whether or not this prediction was
true when first made, it is plausible to posit now that the tradition has discouraged
government from investing in expertise in religious speech. The prediction has become
self-fulfilling.
Longstanding accounts of religious liberty in constitutional theory underscore a
special government fallibility in religious matters. In the Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments, James Madison warned that “the Civil Magistrate is [not]

HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON WAR AND PEACE IN WESTERN AND ISLAMIC TRADITIONS
31, 46 (John Kelsay & James Turner Johnson eds., 1991).
193. BONNER, supra note 191, at 3 (“A typical Book of Jihad [within a larger work of jurisprudence]
includes the law governing the conduct of war, which covers treatment of nonbelligerents, division of
spoils among the victors, and such matters.”); Donner, supra note 192, at 52 (describing the development
of Islamic jus in bello rules).
194. See KHALED ABOU EL FADL, THE PLACE OF TOLERANCE IN ISLAM 11–13 (2002) (describing the
“literal[] and ahistorical[]” Koranic readings used to justify terrorism); HABECK, supra note 11, at 19–39
(sketching the evolution of jihad as a justification for violence). As Olivier Roy points out, “the new jihad
is an individual and personal decision” quite distinct from the “collective duty (fard kifaya)” that jihad
connoted in earlier doctrinal discussions. OLIVIER ROY, GLOBALIZED ISLAM: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW
UMMAH 41–43 (2004); accord GILLES KEPEL, JIHAD: EXPANSION ET DÉCLIN DE I’ISLAMISME 487–88 (2d
ed. 2003).
195. See W. MONTGOMERY WATT, ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY 159–60 (2008) (chronicling
the life, thought, and influence of Ibn-Taymiyya); see also WAEL B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC
LEGAL THEORIES 139–40 (1997) (situating Ibn-Taymiyya in the context of debates about the
epistemological force of analogies); cf. CHARLES ALLEN, GOD’S TERRORISTS: THE WAHHABI CULT AND
THE HIDDEN ROOTS OF MODERN JIHAD 42–48 (2006) (discussing Ibn-Taymiyya’s life and how “his
reinterpretation of jihad lies at the heart of modern Islamist revivalism”).
196. ANNEMARIE SCHIMMEL, MYSTICAL DIMENSIONS OF ISLAM 98, 112 (1975).
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a competent Judge of Religious Truth.”197 He was echoing John Locke’s 1689 first letter
on toleration198 as well as an older Christian theological vein.199 The assumption of state
incompetence in religious matters is widely echoed today by the courts and analysts of
the Religion Clauses. The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that “it is not within
the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether [one person or another]
more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of
scriptural interpretation.”200 Commentators concur. Michael McConnell posits that
“government cannot be a competent judge of religious truth because there is no reason to
believe that religious understanding has been vouchsafed to the majority, or any
governmental elite.”201 And Kent Greenawalt, in a recent comprehensive treatment of the
Religion Clauses, finds general agreement about the “limited competence of secular
courts” in matters of faith.202 There is little dissent, in short, from the proposition that the
state is not competent in matters of religious meaning.
The Madisonian discounting of governmental knowledge of religion rests on an
ambitious and sophisticated epistemological account of religion. Yet, there is no need to
endorse that sophisticated account to conclude that Madison may now be correct. Even if
there is nothing special about religious meaning, there has long been a broad consensus
that the government is not competent in the field of faith. Governments, at least in the
United States, have scant incentive to accrue such knowledge. Long-standing pessimism
about the state’s competence in religious matters yields a self-confirming result:
197. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (“Because the Bill
implies either that the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious Truth; or that he may employ
Religion as an engine of Civil policy. The first is an arrogant pretension falsified by the contradictory
opinions of Rulers in all ages, and throughout the world.”), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION
83 (Philip Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
198. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 220
(Ian Shapiro ed., 2003).
199. See Douglas Laycock, The Many Meanings of Separation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1667, 1672 (2003)
(book review) (collecting Biblical authorities).
200. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981); see also United
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86–87 (1944) (“Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be
put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs . . . . If one could be sent to jail because a jury in a
hostile environment found those teachings false, little indeed would be left of religious freedom.”).
201. Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 24 (2000).
202. 1 GREENAWALT, supra note 124, at 262. Other commentators provide specific grounds for concern
about the status and treatment of religious identity. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 158, at 613 (“[R]eligion
remains as a distinctively dangerous political force, even as it serves for many individuals as an important
source of communal identity, personal understanding, and comfort.”).
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underinvestment in religious knowledge. Quite apart from more ambitious Madisonian
theories, this diachronic dynamic creates doubt about government’s ability to deal with
religious terms accurately.
The third and final source of error lies in the institutional context in which religious
speech is used as a signal. Absent the development of a centralized stock of religious
knowledge, decisions about how to interpret religious speech lie in the hands of
individual investigators and prosecutors. Their incentives push them toward finding
experts such as Khaleel Mohammed, the expert witness who testified in Hayat’s case,
who will confirm that costs sunk into investigations and prosecutions have been well
spent.203 To the extent that government now must rely on outside experts, it risks
compounding rather than mitigating error costs. Jurors, who are generally relied on to
filter out false positives proffered by the government,204 are unlikely to catch errors.
Moreover, to the extent that government must overcome a past failure to invest in
religious competence, its current incentives mean that any investments henceforth
undertaken likely will be tailored to maximize convictions rather than accuracy.
As a threshold matter, there is reason to be skeptical about the decentralized manner
in which decisions about religious speech’s meaning are made. The decision to hire an
expert for a terrorism trial, for example, is made on the retail level, not currently by a
centralized mechanism. The resulting dispersion of authority creates opportunities for
distortion. Pooling discretion at the base of a bureaucratic chain always makes it difficult
to determine whether animus or bias has influenced decision making. William Stuntz has
observed that “discriminatory policing is much harder to combat when the police deal
with individuals” because the retail is much more costly and intractable to monitor than
the wholesale.205 While Stuntz was focused on racial discrimination, the same holds for
religious animus. Writing about the distinct and different problem of discriminatory

203. See Waldman, supra note 7, at 89 (stating that the prosecution in Hayat’s case felt that a prayer
found in Hayat’s wallet was so critical to the case that the prosecution hired Mohammed—who affirmed
that the prayer had no other use than in connection with violent jihad—to interpret it).
204. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998) (“A fundamental premise of our criminal
trial system is that ‘the jury is the lie detector.’” (quoting United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th
Cir. 1973))); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891) (stating that jurors “are presumed to be
fitted for [their task] by their natural intelligence and their practical knowledge of men and the ways of
men”).
205. William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2164 (2002).

42

allocation of subsidies for religious activities, Douglas Laycock argued that “discretion
threatens religious liberty” by enabling line drawing distorted by bias.206 In the context of
federal criminal prosecutions, for example, it is difficult to ensure that the diverse
Assistant U.S. Attorneys making decisions about who to call and use as an expert will not
exercise that discretion in ways that maximize the chances of conviction rather than the
accuracy of trial results.207
Moreover, there are plausible reasons for being skeptical of the market for expertise
that prosecutors must tap in these cases. The provision of terrorism expertise is
lucrative.208 It is reasonable to assume that it will attract rent-seeking interest groups.
Anecdotal evidence suggests state and local police departments depend on “selfdescribed experts whose extremist views are considered inaccurate and harmful by the
FBI.”209 By definition, a government ill equipped with the relevant knowledge cannot
effectively screen out rent-seeking “experts.” Further, there is little empirical evidence
that government imposes demanding requirements in terms of formal credentials.210
Anecdotal evidence from other countries with longer experience with Muslim minorities
supports this skepticism.211 The federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution
(BfV) in Germany, responsible for domestic counterterrorism, for example, has also been
criticized for its incorrect translation of monitored religious groups’ documents, which
have yielded accusations based on weak evidence.212
206. Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Comment: Theology Scholarships, the Pledge
of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV.
155, 195–96 (2004).
207. There is no reason to believe that the adversarial system will throw up the best available expertise
to enable a fact finder to resolve an empirical question. See Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise,
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 184 (2010) (arguing that “[t]hrough selection, affiliation, and compensation biases,
litigants make experts more favorable but less accurate compared to their base rates of accuracy in the real
world”).
208. See, e.g., JOHN MUELLER, OVERBLOWN: HOW POLITICIANS AND THE TERRORISM INDUSTRY
INFLATE THE NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS, AND WHY WE BELIEVE THEM 29–50 (2006) (describing the
“terrorism industry” and condemning its distorting effect on policy choices); Petra Bartosiewicz, Experts in
Terror, NATION, Feb. 4, 2008, http://www.thenation.com/article/experts-terror (noting that one expert
received $135,000 in Justice Department funds in one year).
209. Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, Monitoring American, WASH. POST. Dec. 20, 2010,
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/monitoring-america/
210. Bartosiewicz, supra note 208 (describing one expert who lacked formal academic credentials and
noting that those with credentials are often reluctant to take sides).
211 Elected officials generally evince low levels of understanding of Islam and Muslim constituencies.
See LORENZO VIDINO, THE NEW MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN THE WEST 102-04 (2010).
212. INT’L CRISIS GRP., ISLAM AND IDENTITY IN GERMANY 17 (2007), available at
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Countervailing incentives may mitigate these distortions. Government officials
clearly have a strong incentive to prevent terrorist attacks and a strong fear of being
blamed if they fail. But there is reason to doubt the latter constraint’s effectiveness. As a
threshold matter, the costs and consequences of policy failure are not evenly distributed
so as to encourage efficient policy responses. While the costs of developing a correct
understanding of religious speech in any particular case fall on one official alone, blame
in the case of a terrorist attack is dispersed widely. High-level, visible officials are more
likely than line officials to be publicly held to account. Perceptive counterterrorism
officials will have observed that few officials suffered due to their failure to prevent the
September 11 attacks. For example, the 9/11 Commission highlighted institutional
problems, rather than isolating and blaming particular individuals.213 Moreover, there is
scant evidence that the federal intelligence apparatus in fact can effectively respond to
evolving threats. To the contrary, a leading political science account suggests that
intelligence agencies suffer from a sclerosis that has prevented them from overcoming
Cold War-era mindsets and investment strategies.214 As recent “near misses” suggest,
American counterterrorism bureaucracies appear simply to be quite bad at adapting to
new circumstances.215
In sum, the distinctive characteristics of religious speech and the institutional
environment in which it is used as a signal for counterterrorism ends will predictably
yield a high error rate. In turn, a high error rate means that even if religious speech is

http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/181_islam_in_germany.ashx.
213. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 26, at 73–107 (describing the evolution of
counterterrorist activities in the United States and noting institutional failures in law enforcement, the FAA,
the U.S. Intelligence Community, the State Department, the Department of Defense, the White House, and
Congress that impaired effective counterterrorist efforts).
214. See generally AMY B. ZEGART, SPYING BLIND: THE CIA, THE FBI, AND THE ORIGINS OF 9/11, at
49–56 (2007) (describing how government agencies do not experience the market pressure to adapt that
private firms experience). This was the case even before 9/11. See AMY B. ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN:
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JSC, AND NSC 9 (1999) (“[T]he modern American national security
apparatus has not performed up to par . . . . We do not need a theory of optimal agency design to reach this
conclusion.”).
215. See, e.g., Ben Feller, Obama Acknowledges More ‘Red Flags’ in Flight Plot, BOSTON.COM, Jan. 6,
2010,
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/01/06/obama_acknowledges_more_red_flag
s_in_flight_plot/ (quoting President Obama as saying that the Intelligence Community failed to “‘connect
[the] dots’” and prevent an attempted bombing by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab).

44

otherwise reliable as a signal, the government should be cautious before adopting it to
that end.
B. The Choice of Optimal Signal for Domestic Counterterrorism

Even if law enforcement could overcome these hurdles, there is still the question of
whether religious speech is indeed the optimal signal for counterterrorism ends. This
subpart suggests that it is not. Mounting empirical evidence points away from a
correlation between religious speech and terrorism, and instead highlights the importance
of association—the immediate, insular small groups to which a person is closely linked—
in the development of terrorist violence.
This argument proceeds in four parts. The first introduces basic theories of signaling
in conditions of asymmetric information from economic theory. The second addresses the
question whether religious speech provides an effective signal. The third part looks at
empirical and social science evidence about what does correlate with political violence.
The final part considers constitutional objections to the use of association.
1. Signaling as a Solution to Information Asymmetries.—Governments are searching

for a readily observable trait that reliably correlates with terrorist risk in order to sort
between those who may warrant targeting for investigation or prosecution and those who
do not. To understand solutions to the problem, it is helpful to contrast the position of the
government to the position of an employer searching for productive employees—a
situation that has received much scrutiny in the economics literature.216 An employer
looking at a large pool of job applicants is searching for a candidate who will not shirk or
misbehave once hired. Like the government, the employer operates in a context of
information asymmetry. Candidates know much more about whether they will shirk or
misbehave than the employer does. Like government, employers seek low-cost signals
that reliably sort out false positives in order to hone in on the best candidates for a
position. Both the government searching for threats and the employer searching for

216. This is not the only instance in which government confronts a sorting problem. Identifying desired
migrants from a larger immigration inflow is another example of the problem. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A.
Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 824 (2007) (describing
immigration as an example of a sorting problem where the information relevant to the sorting algorithm is
unknown to the state but may be known to the immigrants).
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employees confront an unsegregated population and seek to sort for a certain “type”
within that population. Crucially, both are concerned that if they identify a signal to
discern the favored population, the disfavored population will simply mimic that
signal.217 Employers, that is, do not want to rely on some indicia of job performance that
less attractive candidates can easily imitate. They must hence contend with two problems:
first, the problem of accuracy in the original signal and, second, the fact that even if a
signal is accurate it will be mimicked by the disfavored class to the extent that it can no
longer serve the sorting function.
In the employer’s case, the sought-after population—i.e., productive potential
employees—has an interest in signaling to the employer who they are. But the disfavored
population—i.e., less productive employees—will try to mimic that signal so as to
persuade the employer that they should be hired and thereby receive higher wages.218 The
entity seeking to use a signal must account for the strategic behavior of one portion of the
population. Both government and employers must pick a signal that minimizes
inaccuracy and also limits the strategic behavior of the disfavored class. In both cases,
“the fact that actions convey information leads people to alter their behavior”219 so “even
small information costs can have large consequences.”220
Economists studying the dynamics of employment markets have developed a
number of approaches and solutions to this distinctively bifurcated selection problem.221
In path-breaking work, Michael Spence identified one solution. He argued that there may
be a “signal [that] actually does distinguish low- and high-productivity people and the
reason it is able to do so is that the cost of the signal is negatively correlated with the
unseen characteristic that is valuable to the employers.”222 In the employment market,
217. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, 92 AM. ECON.
REV. 460, 463–64 (2002) (describing incentives to either share or hide information regarding educational
qualifications by individuals in the Kenyan employment market depending on how the Kenyan government
valued education).
218. See id. (“[T]here are incentives on the part of individuals for information not to be revealed, for
secrecy, or, in modern parlance, for a lack of transparency.”).
219. Id. at 473.
220. Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century
Economics, 115 Q.J. ECON. 1441, 1443 (2000).
221. See id. at 1450–53 (noting different approaches to the selection problem).
222. Spence, supra note 13, at 437 (emphasis added). Spence emphasized the possibility of “multiple
equilibria in the market.” Id. That is, education does not always function as a signal; its capacity to do so
depends on its cost profile.
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education fulfills this function under certain conditions. Education is an accurate proxy
for the characteristics sought by an employer. Moreover, the cost of obtaining education
can be lower for productive candidates than for unproductive candidates. Hence, it is
cheaper for a more productive employee to obtain education and to signal her worth than
it is for an unproductive employee to mimic that signal. The inverse correlation between
productivity and the cost of the signal (education) undercuts the ability of unproductive
candidates to mimic the signal.223 By contrast, if education’s costs were identical for
productive and nonproductive job candidates in the market, the latter would mimic the
educational investments of their more productive peers.224 Education in that case would
no longer play a useful signaling function.
The key to generalizing this model is the existence of two facts: (1) the appearance
of the signal is positively correlated to the desired trait, and (2) the cost of the signal is
negatively correlated with the underlying trait.225 It is, therefore, a necessary but not
sufficient condition for an action to be correlated with a specific trait for it to function as
a signal. There must also be a negative correlation between the favored trait and the cost
of acquiring the signal in order to preclude strategic mimicry.
2. Religious Speech’s Limited Signaling Function.—It should be immediately

apparent from this model that religious speech cannot play an effective signaling role.
Religious speech fails to meet the second necessary criteria for an effective signal: the
cost of either using or avoiding stipulated forms of religious speech is not correlated in
any way with the characteristic government seeks to identify. It is not meaningfully more
expensive for a terrorist to avoid telltale forms of religious speech than it is for a
nonterrorist to do the same. A terrorist group with even a modicum of strategic sense

223. If education is too expensive for either high- or low-productivity workers, it will obviously not
serve the same function.
224. Id. at 440.
225. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 123 (1994) (“Employers are most
likely to be able to draw [positive] inferences when there is an action that industrious applicants can take
that is more attractive to them than to lazy applicants.”); Nick Feltovich et al., Too Cool for School?
Signalling and Countersignalling, 33 RAND J. ECON. 630, 631 (2002) (noting that standard models
conclude that “in a separating equilibrium, ‘high’ types . . . send a costly signal to differentiate themselves
from lower types”).
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would instead encourage its agents to eschew forms of religious behavior that mark them
out as possible suspects.226
The signaling function of religious—almost always Islamic in the current context—
speech in counterterrorism might alternatively be predicated on the claim of a correlation
between terrorist violence and Islamic texts on the assumption that for Muslims these
texts are costly to avoid. Some commentators have indeed contended that there is a close
connection between Islam as a faith and violence, quite apart from the connection
between certain texts and violence.227 On this logic, religious speech works as a signal
because it will be more costly for Muslims than for non-Muslims to abandon such
speech.
But there is in fact very little evidence that religiosity, even in general, is correlated
with the risk of terrorism. Compare the number of attempted terrorist attacks by MuslimAmericans in the United States since 9/11 with the fact that, according to the Pew
Research Center, there are at least 1.4 million Muslim adults age eighteen or older living
in the United States.228 The sheer disparity (measurable in orders of magnitude) between
the number of American Muslims and the quanta of domestic terrorist violence makes a
necessary connection between faith and violence implausible.229 Further, studies of
terrorism fail to find a correlation between terrorism and a particular belief structure such
as Islam. As RAND Institute scholar Bruce Hoffman has observed, any claim of a
historical correlation between terrorism and religion (let alone a specific faith like Islam)
is historically tenuous. None of the eleven identifiable terrorist groups operating in 1968

226. Al Qaeda indeed did in preparing the September 11 attacks. See JERROLD M. POST, THE MIND OF
THE TERRORIST: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM FROM THE IRA TO AL-QAEDA 200 (2007) (describing an
al Qaeda training manual that instructs terrorists to avoid certain behaviors in order to “maintain their
cover”).
227. See, e.g., SAM HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH: RELIGION, TERROR, AND THE FUTURE OF REASON 123
(2004) (“Islam, more than any other religion human beings have devised, has all the makings of a
thoroughgoing cult of death.”) Ralph Peters, Betraying Our Dead: Forgetting the Vows We Made, N.Y.
POST,
Sept. 11,
2009,
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/betraying_our_dead_H6T95r1BTCnkC1UbEdUfs
O (arguing that Islam is not a religion of peace, as evidenced by “the curious absence of Baptist suicide
bombers”).
228. PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: MIDDLE CLASS AND MOSTLY MAINSTREAM 9–10
(2007), available at http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf.
229. Across Muslim majority countries, support for terrorism also varies widely. C. Christine Fair &
Bryan Shepherd, Research Note, Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from Fourteen Muslim Countries, 29
STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 51, 53, 58 tbl.2 (2006).
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was religious, Hoffman notes, and it was not until 1980 that “the first ‘modern’ religious
terrorist groups appear[ed].”230 Time-series studies of the geographic distribution of
global terrorism also illustrate considerable variance uncorrelated to patterns of religious
settlement.231 And a more discrete study of Dutch Muslims found no causal relationship
between religious orthodoxy and political discontent.232
Further evidence of the absence of correlation emerges from comparative analysis of
religious terrorists. Scholars who focus on religiously motivated terrorism instead
emphasize the invariant incidence of terrorist violence across faith groups. No faith has a
monopoly on terrorist violence.233 While religious belief can supply a “transcendent
moralism with which such acts are justified,” the actual content of that belief proves less
important than the social structures and the community of interest that belief binds
together.234 Hence, one study of religious terrorism has identified “remarkable regularity”
in the “organizational design” of Muslim, Jewish, and Christian groups that have resorted
to violence: a thick network of interpersonal linkages that enables “mutual aid.”235 This
anticipates a point developed at greater length in the following section: What enables the
commission of terrorist violence is a person’s network of immediate associations, not his
or her particular beliefs. While religious belief can play an important functional part of
the process of endorsing the use of political violence, its actual content is not terribly
important in accomplishing that end.
230. BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 84–85 (rev. & expanded ed. 2006); see also MATTHEW
CARR, THE INFERNAL MACHINE: A HISTORY OF TERRORISM 239 (2006); ALAN B. KRUEGER, WHAT MAKES
A TERRORIST: ECONOMICS AND THE ROOTS OF TERRORISM 80–81 (2007) (“[R]eligious differences are
among the many potential sources of the grievances that lead to terrorism. They are not the only
reason . . . [and] are not specific to any one religion.”).
231. See Gary LaFree et al., Cross-National Patterns of Terrorism: Comparing Trajectories for Total,
Attributed and Fatal Attacks, 1970–2006, 50 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 622, 639 fig.1 (2010) (listing the
countries with the highest total number of terrorist attacks between 1970 and 2006 as Colombia, France,
India, Israel, Northern Ireland, Pakistan, Russia, Spain, Sri Lanka, and Turkey).
232. See MARIEKE SLOOTMAN & JEAN TILLIE, INST. FOR MIGRATION & ETHNIC STUDIES, PROCESSES OF
RADICALISATION: WHY SOME AMSTERDAM MUSLIMS BECOME RADICALS 4 (2006), available at
http://www.dmo.amsterdam.nl/publish/pages/85462/processesofradicalisationimes.pdf
(stressing
that
“orthodoxy does not lead automatically to political discontent (and from there to potential radicalisation),
and vice versa” because “the religious and political dimensions are independent of each other”).
233. See MARK JUERGENSMEYER, TERROR IN THE MIND OF GOD: THE GLOBAL RISE OF RELIGIOUS
VIOLENCE, at xi (3d ed. 2003) (“Violent ideas and images are not the monopoly of any single religion.
Virtually every major religious tradition . . . has served as a resource for violent actors.”).
234. Id. at 10–11.
235. ELI BERMAN, RADICAL, RELIGIOUS, AND VIOLENT: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF TERRORISM 16
(2009).
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This claim of correlation, however, might be amended to yield a narrower
hypothesis: that there is a correlation between certain strands of Islam and political
violence. Yet the relationship between the specific religious doctrine of sects in Islam and
terrorist action appears fluid and contingent. Case studies of more rigidly doctrinaire
strands of Islam yield surprisingly little evidence of connection between these traditions
and political violence. Connections between violence and the revisionist puritanical Saudi
strain of Wahhabism, for example, are slim.236 The Salafi movement out of which
al Qaeda emerges has factions that support and factions that oppose violent political
action.237 One Salafi group has even decreed “a general ban on politico and jihadi
publications.”238 The most comprehensive study of a Western Salafist group currently
available rejects the notion that “the uniqueness of Islam” explains political violence and
instead favors an explanation focused on the “shared mechanisms of contention”
particular to the group at hand, not the contents of doctrine.239 Investigations of
developments among Salafist groups in Egypt also emphasize divisions inside the
movement, with prominent leaders of that movement explicitly condemning the actions
of al Qaeda, in particular the commission of terrorist attacks.240 Sects that agree on a
political role for Islam diverge about the legitimacy of violence in achieving an Islamic
state,241 and consensus on Islamic doctrine consistently coexists with sharp disagreement
about the use of violence.242 The connection between religious ideology, even defined at

236. See EL FADL, supra note 194, at 10–11 (“Wahhabism and its militant offshoots share both
attitudinal and ideological orientations. . . . But Wahhabism is distinctively inward-looking—although
focused on power, it primarily asserts power over other Muslims.”).
237. Quintan Wiktorowicz, Anatomy of the Salafi Movement, 29 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 207,
208, 225–28 (2006) [hereinafter Wiktorowicz, Anatomy]; Quintan Wiktorowicz, A Genealogy of Radical
Islam, 28 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 75, 75 (2005) [hereinafter Wiktorowicz, Genealogy].
238. Wiktorowicz, Anatomy, supra note 237, at 221.
239. QUINTAN WIKTOROWICZ, RADICAL ISLAM RISING: MUSLIM EXTREMISM IN THE WEST 14 (2005).
240. See FAWAZ A. GERGES, JOURNEY OF THE JIHADIST: INSIDE MUSLIM MILITANCY 224–29 (2007)
(describing the fractured Islamist reaction to 9/11); FAWAZ A. GERGES, THE FAR ENEMY: WHY JIHAD
WENT GLOBAL 29–34 (2005) (illustrating the struggle between jihadi leaders about whether their efforts
should be focused locally or globally); Peter Bergen & Paul Cruickshank, The Unraveling: Al Qaeda’s
Revolt Against bin Laden, NEW REPUBLIC, June 11, 2008, at 16, 18 (describing the repudiation of al Qaeda
by Sayyid Imam Al Sharif, the organization’s “ideological godfather”). Similarly, radical Islamists in Libya
have also repudiated political violence. Id. at 17.
241. See Farhad Khosrokhavar, The Psychology of the Global Jihadists (identifying specific sects that
disagree on the use of violence), in THE FUNDAMENTALIST MINDSET 139, 139 (Charles B. Strozier et al.
eds., 2010).
242. Wiktorowicz, Genealogy, supra note 237, at 75, 87.
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a relatively specific level within a particular faith tradition, and attitudes to political
violence is therefore thin.
Finally, it is worth noting that studies have also rejected other frequently suggested
causes of terrorist violence. The political science, sociology, and psychology literature,
for example, uniformly rejects dispositional, psychological accounts of terrorism, i.e.,
accounts grounded in terrorists’ individualized pathologies.243 Dean Louise Richardson
pithily observes that “terrorists, by and large, are not insane.”244 Efforts to build “a
terrorist profile” or to predict which individuals will engage in terrorism “have invariably
failed.”245 Summarizing recent research, Richardson acknowledges that there are
psychological traits common to those who use terrorist violence: “Terrorists see the world
in Manichean, black-and-white terms; they identify with others [i.e., as part of a larger
communal whole]; and they desire revenge.”246 But it is not clear whether these attitudes
are a predisposition for the commission of terrorist violence or whether they are a
consequence of having already become committed to terrorist action. Nor is poverty,
another frequent suspect, meaningfully correlated with terrorism.247
In summary, not only religion but also other commonly assumed causes of
243. There is a large body of literature on psychological profiling. See MICHAEL P. ARENA & BRUCE A.
ARRIGO, THE TERRORIST IDENTITY: EXPLAINING THE TERRORIST THREAT 4 (2006) (noting that research
describing those who commit terrorist acts as “intrapsychically flawed, abnormal, and/or psychopathic is
rare and typically of poor quality”); id. at 26, 229 (finding “serious limitations” in the focus on individual
abnormality); JOHN HORGAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM 28–46 (2005) (discussing the limitation of
psychology literature on terrorism but stressing the importance of an “environmental context which gives
rise to, sustains, directs, and controls it”); MARC SAGEMAN, UNDERSTANDING TERROR NETWORKS 83–91
(2004) (reviewing and rejecting psychological personality explanations); Arie Kruglanski & Shira Fishman,
The Psychology of Terrorism: “Syndrome” versus “Tool” Perspectives, 18 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE
193, 195, 200–01 (2006) (noting that “the systematic quest for a unique terrorist personality has yielded
few encouraging results” and rejecting the idea of a “uniform socio-psychological phenomenon” of the
terrorist “syndrome”); Max Taylor & John Horgan, A Conceptual Framework for Addressing
Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist, 18 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 585, 585
(2006) (finding “little or no evidence of particular or distinctive individual qualities being associated with
the terrorist”); Charles Tilly, Terror as Strategy and Relational Process, 46 INT’L J. COMP. SOC. 11, 21
(2005) (“If we are trying to explain when, where, and how people actually engage in terror, relational
explanations will serve us far better than systemic or dispositional explanations.”).
244. RICHARDSON, supra note 189, at 14–15, 41. Psychologist Marc Sageman’s study found evidence
of childhood conduct disorders in a small minority of the sample of Islamist terrorists he studied (four of
sixty-one). SAGEMAN, supra note 243, at 80–83.
245. RICHARDSON, supra note 189, at 14–15, 41.
246. Id. at 41; see also id. at 41–44 (noting that these are reasons why individuals join a terrorist group
in the first place).
247. See Edward Newman, Exploring the “Root Causes” of Terrorism, 29 STUD. CONFLICT &
TERRORISM 749, 750–52 (2006) (finding no correlation between terrorist acts and either poverty or
educational deprivation).
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terrorism—such as psychological defects or poverty—all fail to show the characteristics
of a signal. They are not positively correlated to the incidence of terrorism. Even if there
were proof of a correlation, there is no evidence that the cost of abandoning certain forms
of religious speech would be negatively correlated with a likelihood of commitment to
political violence. Religious speech, therefore, is a poor fit for the signaling function in
counterterrorism.
3. Insular Groups and Terrorist Violence.—Another trait does, however, correlate

with the incidence of political violence and has the appropriate cost profile to render it
resilient to mimicry. There is growing empirical evidence that the characteristics of a
suspect’s close and immediate associations have these two characteristics: Association
with individuals who in turn are affiliated with terrorism, or are believed to present
terrorist risks, is correlated with the risk of terrorism. Further, because such association is
causally linked to the production of terrorism, it is more costly for those wishing to
engage in terrorism to give up those associations than for others.
The basic insight was captured in the U.K. Guardian newspaper in late 2006 by
humorist Urmee Khan, who offered a list of ten “do’s-and-don’ts” for British Muslims.
Number four was “Don’t join groups or clubs”:
Somewhere there is a dusty office in Whitehall whose function is to ban
organisations . . . . The room is probably full of mildewed, dusty files about
Northern Ireland’s paramilitary groups, and there is no doubt a faded map of
Belfast peeling from the wall. But now the dust has been blown off, because
there is a use for the office again.
....
If you are a barking mad, dangerous extremist, in a group prepared to
countenance violence to get their way, then you better make sure that you are
white. For Muslims, this is a no-no. So, to be a fully accredited ordinary, decent
Muslim, you should join only the Scouts, the Brownies or—if force is your
thing—the British Army.248
The social science literature strongly suggests that Khan’s wit hits close to the mark.
A consensus in that literature exists about one aspect of the process of becoming a
terrorist: its connection with insular groups. This consensus suggests that “[i]f we are
248. Urmee Khan, How to Be an ‘Ordinary, Decent’ Muslim, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Aug. 31, 2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/aug/31/religion.uk.
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trying to explain when, where, and how people actually engage in terror, relational
explanations will serve us far better than systemic or dispositional explanations.”249 In
particular, a person’s immediate, intimate circle of association plays an important role in
becoming a terrorist: “[T]he process of radicalisation takes place in the framework of a
small group of friends.”250 Associational context correlates better with the incidence of
terrorist violence than religious speech. And, as explored in greater detail below,
association has the necessary cost profile to limit mimicry: It appears to be difficult to
become a terrorist without the appropriate cluster of associations.
The empirical and social science literature on political violence suggests that
terrorism is frequently seeded in small groups with distinctive idioms and discourses.
“Arguably the most important development for understanding the causes of terrorism are
within group dynamics.”251 Such group dynamics and structures can be observed even
within al Qaeda.252 Within groups, shared and insular idioms, identities, and discourses
prove pivotal to terrorism’s etiology.253 The production of terrorism itself is “undeniably
a group process,” in the sense that individuals almost invariably accrue necessary
249. Tilly, supra note 243, at 21. In his larger work, Tilly emphasizes the collective context of
contentious political claim making in general. See CHARLES TILLY, THE POLITICS OF COLLECTIVE
VIOLENCE 31 (2003) (“[E]very actor that engages in claim making includes at least one cluster of
previously connected persons among whom have circulated widely accepted stories concerning their
strategic situation . . . .”).
250. Olivier Roy, Al Qaeda in the West as a Youth Movement: The Power of a Narrative 16
(MICROCON,
Policy
Working
Paper
No. 2,
2008),
available
at
http://www.microconflict.eu/publications/PWP2_OR.pdf.
251. JASON FRANKS, RETHINKING THE ROOTS OF TERRORISM 41 (2006); see also ARENA & ARRIGO,
supra note 243, at 73–74 (stressing the centrality of “group relationships” because “groups have a more
immediate influence on shaping behavior” than traits such as race, religion, or ethnicity); RICHARDSON,
supra note 189, at 45 (noting that becoming a terrorist “requires a charismatic leader or a functioning
organization to mix these feelings [of simplification, identification, and revenge] . . . and turn them into
action”); WIKTOROWICZ, supra note 239, at 14–15 (describing the importance of social networks to
recruitment for Islamist groups); HORGAN, supra note 243, at 34, 104–07; Kruglanski & Fishman, supra
note 243, at 199–201; Taylor & Horgan, supra note 243, at 590–91, 598 (all noting the importance of group
context and emphasizing “gradual socialization” into committing terrorist acts).
252. See ROY, supra note 194, at 50 (“Islamic radical movements are always structured as a sect, with a
tight-knit core and a looser network of sympathisers.”); David J. Kilcullen, Countering Global Insurgency,
28 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 597, 603 (2005) (describing al Qaeda as modeled “on a traditional Middle Eastern
patronage network” with an intricate “web of dependency” that is “like a tribal group”).
253. See TILLY, supra note 249, at 32 (“[C]onstituent units of claim-making actors often consist not of
living breathing individuals, but of groups, organizations, bundles of social relations, and social sites such
as occupations and neighborhoods.”); Anthony Oberschall, Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of
Collective Action Theory, 22 SOC. THEORY 26, 27–28 (2004) (noting the importance of organizational
capacity for achieving terrorist violence); Jerrold M. Post et al., The Terrorists in Their Own Words:
Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists, 15 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 171, 175
(2003) (observing the salience of group identity among the terrorists studied).
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incentives and skills to commit terrorist violence within group contexts.254 These groups
may be nested in a larger network structure with independent dynamics. But it is the
intimate, insular circle of friends that warrants separate study for its incubational function
in relation to terrorism. Absent this distinctive associational context, the literature
suggests, terrorism is potentially prohibitively costly to generate.255
To understand the central importance of insular groups, consider terrorism’s
gestation in purely functional terms (and, solely for the purpose of analysis, stripped of
moral implications). Recruitment to terrorism faces at least two obstacles.256 First, it
confronts a collective-action problem. Commission of terrorist violence means a small
minority shoulders the cost of political action on behalf of a larger group. Suicide
terrorism, for instance, may be collectively rational; individually, it is (generally)
considered not. Hence, a collective enterprise such as al Qaeda has quite different
incentives when it comes to planning and committing terrorist acts than its constituent
members. As one study of suicide bombing has observed, organizations “reap multiple
benefits on various levels without incurring significant costs” from attacks—a
characterization that would be inapposite applied to the individual attackers.257 In most
cases, collective-action problems ought to render it unlikely that a discrete group will
assume risks of political action otherwise spread across a broader population.258 How can
a rational terrorist organization surmount this free-rider problem?259
254. HORGAN, supra note 243, at 294.
255. But it not impossible: the claim here is probabilistic, not a matter of formal logic.
256. This is not to suggest that in every group there is a clearly identified facilitator. There are some
anecdotal accounts of groups moving collectively toward endorsement and use of terrorist violence, rather
than being moved in that direction by the conscious actions of one individual. Some studies of terrorist
recruitment among European Muslims, for example, highlight the role of “gatekeepers[,] . . . veteran
militants who fought against the Soviets in the 1980s, or radicals who have trained in jihad camps.” Petter
Nesser, Jihadism in Western Europe After the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the
Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe, 29 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 323, 326 (2006); see
also Donald Black, The Geometry of Terrorism, 22 SOC. THEORY 14, 16 (2004) (“Pure terrorism is not only
collective but well organized.”). But see Kruglanski & Fishman, supra note 243, at 199–200 (observing a
variety of leadership, charismatic and otherwise, among terrorist groups).
257. MIA BLOOM, DYING TO KILL: THE ALLURE OF SUICIDE TERROR 76 (2005); cf. id. at 84
(distinguishing between the individual and group rationality of suicide bombing). For an individual,
hypothesized posthumous spiritual rewards or the psychic gain of imagining an opponent’s losses might
arguably suffice to make an act of suicide terrorism rational.
258. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 1–3, 7 (1971) (“[W]hen a number of individuals have a common or collective interest—when they
share a single purpose or objective—individual, unorganized action . . . will either not be able to advance
that common interest at all, or will not be able to advance that interest adequately.”); id. at 33–36
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The second obstacle is ethical in nature. Terrorism requires the commission of
violence outside the accepted portfolio of political strategies and entails acts that often
transgress widely shared ethical boundaries.260 Ethical scruples generally stand in the way
of terrorist violence, or at least impose heavy costs on its commission, especially for
those that a terrorist organization seeks to recruit from a culture and educational
environment that otherwise rejects terrorism. Ethical scruples are often the focus of
effective counterterrorism strategy, which have often been focused on persuading
potential and actual users of terrorist violence that the latter is morally wrong.261 The
United Kingdom takes this approach now. One analyst characterized British
counterterrorism policy as bearing “far more resemblance to countering an insurgency
than to countering terrorism” because it is aimed at “winning over the communities at the
heart of the problem.”262
It is the distinctive characteristics of small groups that provide the transformative
environment for both preferences related to risk taking and also ethical tastes. In Dean
Richardson’s evocative phrase, groups are “complicit surround[s].”263 They are
environments “in which violence is condoned and even glorified” in ways that reorient
individuals toward the willingness to use asymmetrical violence against strangers.264
While it is of course the case that not all small groups serve as incubators for violence, it
is also the case that terrorism’s production is regularly linked to a small group
environment and that complicit surrounds play a causal role in becoming a terrorist.
Consider first the collective-action barrier to terrorism. As sociologist Michael
(explaining why “the larger the group, the less it will further its common interests”).
259. See Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard et al., The Political Economy of Freedom, Democracy and
Transnational Terrorism, 128 PUB. CHOICE 289, 291 (2006) (discussing the “early application of rational
choice theory to the study of terrorism”); Michael Munger, Preference Modification vs. Incentive
Manipulation as Tools of Terrorist Recruitment: The Role of Culture, 128 PUB. CHOICE 131, 132, 138
(2006) (noting the risk of free riding).
260. See Charles Tilly, Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists, 22 SOC. THEORY 5, 5 (2004) (describing terrorism
as the “asymmetrical deployment of threats and violence against enemies using means that fall outside the
forms of political struggle routinely operating within some current regime”).
261. See Kruglanski & Fishman, supra note 243, at 202–03.
262. JOHN MACKINLAY, THE INSURGENT ARCHIPELAGO 199 (2009).
263. RICHARDSON, supra note 189, at 49.
264. Id. Richardson uses the phrase to describe broader public cultures, but it also has resonance here.
Cf. Dennis Chong, Values Versus Interests in the Explanation of Social Conflict, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2079,
2105 (1996) (“Individuals tend to form their views on social issues within the context of specific group
memberships.”).
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Munger explains, one way of overcoming free-rider problems is by altering tastes.
Discussing terrorist recruitment, Munger identifies “culture” as the “shared understanding
of something that identifies insiders.”265 It is these shared understandings and distinctive
idioms and arguments that are pivotal to terrorism’s production. According to Munger,
culture is the vehicle for changing “metapreference[s], in the sense [that] it tells us what
we should want to want.”266 For the terrorist recruiter, the complicit surround supplied by
a group constitutes the medium for transforming tastes.267 And culture, in the form of
shared idioms, understandings, and arguments, furnishes the lever for change.268 As Eric
Hoffer, writing in 1951 in the shadow of Nazism and Stalinism, summarized the process:
“For men to plunge headlong into an undertaking of vast change, they must be intensely
discontented yet not destitute, and they must have the feeling that by possession of some
potent doctrine, infallible leader, or some new technique, they have access to a source of
irresistible power.”269
Terrorist groups have tools to overcome collective-action problems.270 Reviewing
recent research, Max Taylor and John Horgan argue that groups provide cultural
reorientation for terrorists. Groups are a “Community of Practice,” i.e., a “structure to
understand the emergence of ideological and social control” that can fashion new
ideological and practical political commitments.271 Within that framework, the group’s
culture influences individual identity and “the meanings that persons attach to the
265. Munger, supra note 259, at 153.
266. Id. at 144.
267. The salience of culture as a source of tastes and preferences is not limited to terrorism. Lauding
networks of shared production, Yochai Benkler argues that such networks provide “shared frames of
meaning” through which individuals decide what “institutions and decisions are considered ‘legitimate’ and
worthy of compliance and participation,” and “what courses of action are attractive.” YOCHAI BENKLER,
THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 274–75
(2006). Contemporary terrorism involves a similar pooling of ideas and social capital for quite different
purposes. Another relevant analytic frame that might be applied here is Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of
“habitus.” See PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 78 (Richard Nice trans., 1972)
(defining habitus as a “durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations” that produces
regular behavioral patterns).
268. A religious “community represents an ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an organic entity not
reducible to a mere aggregation of individuals.” Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring).
269. ERIC HOFFER, THE TRUE BELIEVER: THOUGHTS ON THE NATURE OF MASS MOVEMENTS 11 (1951).
270. In some contexts, this includes provision of nonspiritual services, in the form of material aid to the
families and intimates of group members. BERMAN, supra note 235, at 75–78 (describing the use of mutual
aid).
271. Taylor & Horgan, supra note 243, at 590–93.
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multiple roles they typically play.”272 The group’s tools are “shared symbols” whereby
“members partake of common encapsulations of their orientations.”273 That common
culture creates “interpretative schemata that provide a cognitive structure for
comprehending the surrounding environment” and, significantly, “a language and
cognitive tools for making sense of events and experiences by interpreting causation,
evaluating situations, and offering prescriptive remedies.”274 It is, in Clifford Geertz’s
famous summation, “context” that makes acts and expressions “intelligibl[e].”275
Through group identification, individuals revise their contextualized sense of individual
interests.276 Acts of violence previously seen as “maladaptive or even self-destructive”
are refashioned as rational.277
Some legal scholars have noted the salience of sociolinguistic dynamics to the
actions and internal dynamics of other violent or antisocial small groups. Examining the
dynamics of criminal conspiracies, Neal Katyal has argued that small-group contexts
facilitate transformations of individual preferences and self-identifications as members
“tend to refer more to each other than they do to outsiders, listen more to each other, and
reward each other more often.”278 Katyal also notes that “people are far more likely to
experience doubts about their performance and disillusionment when they act as

272. Sheldon Stryker & Peter J. Burke, The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity Theory, 63 SOC.
PSYCHOL. Q. 284, 284 (2000). Relevant here, Stryker and Burke describe how the “structure and
connectedness” of groups “provides the first level of social structures’ impact on identities.” Id. at 289.
273. Lawrence Rosen, The Integrity of Cultures, 34 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 594, 595 (1991). As Alan
Krueger notes, terrorists tend to be educated and thus to have developed a political vocabulary. The utterly
dispossessed, by contrast, lack the rhetorical arsenal necessary for the turn to violence and thus rarely
engage in terrorism. See KRUEGER, supra note 230, at 7, 46–48 (suggesting terrorists are more likely to
come from moderate-income and high-income countries than from low-income countries).
274. WIKTOROWICZ, supra note 239, at 15–16 (emphasis added).
275. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 14 (1973).
276. See AMY GUTMANN, IDENTITY IN DEMOCRACY 14 (2003) (“[R]ecognition of interests often follows
from group identification rather than being given simply by the pre-existing interests of individuals apart
from their group identifications.”); Post et al., supra note 253, at 176 (“[I]ndividual measures of success
become increasingly linked to the organization and stature and accomplishments within the organization.”).
277. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Economics and Identity, 115 Q.J. ECON. 715, 717 (2000).
Relevant here, Akerlof and Kranton observe that identity also underlies “a new type of externality.” Id.
They give the example of socialization into gender roles, and how a man wearing a dress creates
externalities in the form of other men’s anxieties about masculinity. Id. Analogously, an individual
recruited to be a terrorist may experience new externalities as a result of exposure to “impure” cultures.
These in turn may reinforce his turn toward the group.
278. Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1317 (2003).
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individuals compared to when they act as groups.”279 The medium of such
transformations is the shared idiom and discursive practice of the group.280 Elaborating
on the idea of group polarization, Cass Sunstein identifies its mechanisms: informational
cascades, whereby “small or even large groups of people end up believing something—
even if that something is false—simply because other people seem to believe that it is
true”;281 the effect of a “limited argument pool” that also “operate[s] in favor of group
polarization”;282 and the tendency of a group’s members to view themselves in “selfcontrast to others.”283 Through a distinctive way of speaking, groups reengineer
individual preferences, often into closer alignment with group interests. This deemphasis
of individual interests, with a concomitant elevation of group-based interests, is
concretely how group culture surmounts collective-action problems.284
“Culture” within an insular group is also relevant to the second obstacle to
recruitment to terrorism violence: the ethical tastes that would normally preclude
violence. Terrorist recruitment entails “not only instrumental but also moral justification
that would lend it legitimacy above and beyond its instrumentality as a means.”285
Ideologies inculcated by a terrorist group “relate distant events to immediate behaviour,”
vesting specific acts and circumstances with new meaning.286 The “tight-knit” and
“secret[ive]” clusters287 that constitute terrorist groups furnish an environment for this

279. Id. at 1322.
280. Psychological research, explains Katyal, demonstrates that groups often polarize to “extreme
attitudes and behaviors,” and alter members’ perceptions of their own preferences. Id. at 1316–21. There
are feedback loops between group identity and group rewards. See, e.g., id. at 1362–63. Group polarization
is “a predictable shift within a group discussing a case or problem. As the shift occurs . . . groups coalesce,
not toward the middle of antecedent dispositions, but toward a more extreme position in the direction
indicated by those dispositions.” Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110
YALE L.J. 71, 85 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble]; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Group
Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 979–81,
985–86 (2005) [hereinafter Sunstein, Group Judgments] (comparing the function of deliberation in problem
solving and the ability of individuals and groups to answer questions correctly).
281. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble, supra note 280, at 82 (asserting that “[p]eople think and do what
they think . . . relevant others think and do” thanks to informational cascades and reputational sanctions).
282. Id. at 107.
283. Id. at 98.
284. See WIKTOROWICZ, supra note 239, at 18 (“For Islamist groups, socialization is thus critical for
mobilizing support and activism in the face of extensive costs and risks.”).
285. Kruglanski & Fishman, supra note 243, at 206.
286. Taylor & Horgan, supra note 243, at 58, 61.
287. ROY, supra note 194, at 50.
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reorientation of ethical tastes.288 At the same time, groups satisfy a separate taste,
supplying a new sense of camaraderie and belonging.289 Contemporary studies of
terrorists also find strong beliefs in the justice of terror as a political strategy.290 Such new
solidarities, indeed, are collateral consequences of the “decentralized norms” and
“governance structures” that flourish in complicit surrounds.291 This also happens in other
social groups that adopt violent tactics for expressive ends. In neo-Nazi groups, for
example, participants acquire a taste for violence on joining the group. One female neoNazi explained, “It is remarkable how fast I shifted my boundaries regarding violence. I
used to be against violence, but now it does not cost me a penny to beat up and take out
my aggression on someone who represents what I hate.”292 Quite literally, group
membership changes the personal cost of ethical transgression.293
These models suggest that small groups could provide the environment for
generating terrorism. Empirical case studies of violent Islamic political movements,
especially in the recent European context, supplement the theoretical model by showing
that complicit surrounds do provide a nurturing environment for terrorism. These studies
bear out the theoretical insights about the role of group culture in overcoming collective288. Michael Walzer has suggested that “moral life is rooted in a kind of association that military
discipline precludes or temporarily cuts off” because of the pressures of conformity, the presumption of
superior orders’ validity, and the pervasive need to participate in unreflective coordinated action. MICHAEL
WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 316 (1977).
One way of seeing the moral valence of terrorist groups is an effort to re-create, or even heighten, this
aspect of military life.
289. Marc Sageman succinctly calls it the “‘bunch of guys’ phenomenon”: “cliques commonly produce
social cohesion and a collective identity and foster solidarity, trust, community, political inclusion . . . and
other valuable social outcomes.” SAGEMAN, supra note 243, at 155–57; see also RICHARDSON, supra note
189, at 48 (noting that many activists speak of an “intense feeling of camaraderie within the group”);
Chong, supra note 264, at 2110 (“People will sometimes defend values that appear to run against their
immediate self-interest in order to preserve social relationships that return long-term benefits.”); cf.
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Untold Story of al Qaeda’s Administrative Law Dilemmas, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 1302, 1339–40 (2007) (noting al Qaeda’s use of financial resources to secure loyalty). In his account
of joining Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Ed Husain notes that members gained greater social standing within the group
for “more extrovert[ed]” expressions of solidarity with the group. ED HUSAIN, THE ISLAMIST 67 (2007).
290. See Kruglanski & Fishman, supra note 243, at 203 (rejecting the idea of a “uniform sociopsychological phenomenon” of the terrorist “syndrome”); Post et al., supra note 253, at 179 (describing
how different terrorists justified their actions as a means to affect political change).
291. Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 373–76 (2003).
292. Karsten Hundeide, Becoming a Committed Insider, 9 CULTURE & PSYCHOL. 107, 111 (2003)
(emphasis added).
293. One example of ethical reorientation is al-Muhajiroun’s use of the doctrine of takfir, or “the
process of declaring a Muslim an unbeliever.” WIKTOROWICZ, supra note 239, at 174. Al-Muhajiroun has
developed an intricately exhaustive enumeration of reasons for declaring individuals takfiri, hence, moving
them beyond the pale of ethical concern. Id. at 75.
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action problems and dissolving ethical hurdles.
In the European context, sociologist Olivier Roy has found that most “militants
broke with their own past and experienced an individual re-Islamisation in a small cell of
uprooted fellows.”294 The group responsible for the July 2005 London attacks, for
example, coalesced out of an “informal social network” in mosques and bookstores, a
network that provided opportunities for the conspiracy’s leader “to identify candidates for
indoctrination, even if the indoctrination itself took place more privately to avoid
detection.”295
Individuals generally portrayed as lone actors also prove to be embedded in intimate
networks.296 The murderer of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, Muhammad Bouyeri, for
example, was no lone actor, despite the solitary, idiosyncratic nature of his crime. He had
drifted into the Hofstad Group, “a jihadist group headed by a Syrian radical preacher,”
Abu Khatib.297 Comprising sixteen militants, the Hofstad Group included a spiritual
leader and three people who had trained in Pakistan or Afghanistan.298 What first
appeared as the act of a crazed psychopath in fact emerged from a thick local network of
social relations and religious ideological commitments.
More relevant data comes from a study by the French sociologist Farhad
Khosrokhavar. He conducted detailed interviews with fifteen of the twenty men
imprisoned in France based on suspected or confirmed membership in an al Qaeda

294. ROY, supra note 194, at 52; see also id. at 316–19 (describing the formation of networks in Europe
and the United States); GILLES KEPEL, THE WAR FOR MUSLIM MINDS: ISLAM AND THE WEST 250 (Pascale
Ghazaleh trans., 2004); OLIVIER ROY, THE POLITICS OF CHAOS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 144–45 (Ros Schwartz
trans., 2008) (both noting the possibility of increasing cycles of alienation among Muslim youth in Europe).
295. REPORT ON LONDON BOMBINGS, supra note 27, at 16–17; see also SLOOTMAN & TILLIE, supra
note 232, at 5 (describing radicalization as a “social phenomenon”).
296. Bruce Hoffman points out that the “terrorist is also very different from the lunatic assassin, who
may use identical tactics,” and distinguishes the “political” goals of a group from the “intrinsically
idiosyncratic, completely egocentric and deeply personal” attitude of an individual violent actor, even one
such as Sirhan Sirhan (Robert Kennedy’s assassin), who acted for explicitly political ends. HOFFMAN,
supra note 230, at 37. Hoffman argues that an individual acting alone is not properly categorized as a
“terrorist.” Id.
297. Nesser, supra note 256, at 334; see also IAN BURUMA, MURDER IN AMSTERDAM: THE DEATH OF
THEO VAN GOGH AND THE LIMITS OF TOLERANCE 193–95, 205–16 (2006) (recounting Bouyeri’s
involvement in the Hofstad Group).
298. Nesser, supra note 256, at 334–35. Evidence suggested that the group had planned attacks on
Dutch public and governmental sites before being broken up by police. Id.
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affiliate, and he found few common social or economic traits.299 Instead, Khosrokhavar
identified shared representations of the world and life and shared idiosyncratic
interpretation of symbols, events, and religious texts as the common ground among his
interviewees.300 Through their complicit surrounds, Khosrokhavar’s respondents had
developed idiosyncratic views of the world and idioms that would have been hard to
develop in more diverse normative and ethical contexts.301 In another study of five
terrorist organizations, Michael Arena and Bruce Arrigo also found that “symbols
developed shared meanings within individual groups and among their respective
memberships through exposure to history, culture, socialization, and social structure.”302
Furthermore, studies of terrorists in the Middle East yield evidence that distinctive
discourses and idioms are critical to terrorist groups. In a study of captured Middle
Eastern terrorists, for example, Jerrold Post and his colleagues identified a characteristic
“framework” and a “common bond of belief” as regularities among the terrorists they
profiled.303 They found a consistent “readiness to merge . . . individual identity with that
of the organization in pursuit of their cause.”304 Once this “clear fusing of individual
identity and group identity” occurs, “the organization’s success become[s] central to
individual identity and provides a ‘reason for living.’”305 Similarly, Bernard Rougier’s
study of jihadist networks in Lebanon’s Palestinian camps emphasizes “the way
preachers played a decisive role in reframing social reality exclusively in religious
categories,” transforming “perceptions of self and other.”306
Case studies of terrorist histories confirm that groups create and share an internal
299. FARHAD KHOSROKHAVAR, QUAND AL-QAÏDA PARLE: TÉMOIGNAGES DERRIÈRE LES BARREAUX 11,
20–21 (2006).
300. “Il faut . . . tenter de comprendre les mécanismes subjectifs qui leur donnent leur spécificité,
commandant leur representation du monde et leur vécu, les sentiments religioux qui les animent.” Id. In one
of Khrosrokhaver’s fascinating interviews, one informant sketches his view of an unbridgeable gap
between Islam and the West and specifically describes the separation as a failure of interpretation: “Il y a
une histoire commune entre l’Occident et l’islam mais en fait, rien n’est commun. L’interpretation n’est
pas commune.” Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
301. Cf. FARHAD KHOSROKHAVAR, INSIDE JIHADISM: UNDERSTANDING JIHADI MOVEMENTS
WORLDWIDE 9–10 (2009) (noting the evidence that shows that “Jihadist cells are formed in relation to ties
of family, friendship, local residence, and kinship relations”).
302. ARENA & ARRIGO, supra note 243, at 230–31.
303. Post et al., supra note 253, at 176.
304. Id. at 175.
305. Id.
306. BERNARD ROUGIER, EVERYDAY JIHAD: THE RISE OF MILITANT ISLAM AMONG PALESTINIANS IN
LEBANON 21 (Pascale Chazaleh trans., 2007).
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“context . . . within which [acts and expressions] can be intelligibl[e].”307 It is the “shared
symbols”308 of particular group cultures that give sense to doctrine and texts, from the
throat note in the Hayat case to the Koranic verses and hadith on jihad. Consequently, it
cannot be assumed that the meaning assigned by a broader religious culture to a particular
text will be shared by a subgroup.309 The latter may take a more or less aggressive view
of a text. In the prosecution of Hayat, by contrast, the state’s expert witness (and the jury)
erroneously assumed that speech’s local context had no relevance and that meaning was
fungible between different factions and strands of a religious community.310 The evidence
about terrorism’s etiology suggests precisely the opposite: it is idiosyncratic and
distinctive local discursive contexts, not universally available religious meanings, that
enable the transformation of ethical tastes and preferences. Generalizing inferences from
the communal to the individual creates a special risk of error when made without
knowledge of an individual’s local circumstances,311 at least in the absence of
countervailing factors.312
Empirical evidence, in sum, suggests that the production of terrorist violence is
correlated with the presence of an insular group that provides a complicit surround for
recruits and enables the reorientation of individuals’ ethical values and normative
commitments. Studies from varied disciplinary angles—from empirical sociology to
history to rational-actor analysis—all confirm the importance of such groups.
The causal connection between complicit surrounds and the production of terrorist
307. GEERTZ, supra note 275, at 14.
308. Rosen, supra note 273, at 595; see also KHOSROKHAVAR, supra note 301, at 18 (emphasizing the
coherence of “Jihadist ideology”).
309. Winnifred Sullivan observes that the vast majority of religious practice in America is made up of
“folkways,” not “high tradition.” SULLIVAN, IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 169, at
140–41, 146. In deciding which religious practices to recognize and protect, courts must decide what
“counts legally [as] religion.” Id. at 147. Sullivan argues that courts have placed themselves “at odds with
the mainstream of American religion” by failing to focus on local practices. Id.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 38–57.
311. Anthropologists have long been acutely aware of “the difficulty of grasping the world of alien
peoples—the many years of learning and unlearning needed, the problems of acquiring a thorough
linguistic competence” and, perhaps more relevant here, the “both subtle and blatant” ways understanding
is “directed or circumscribed by . . . informants.” James Clifford, On Ethnographic Authority,
REPRESENTATIONS, Spring 1983, at 118, 122, 135.
312. There may be other factors cutting in favor of wider judgments. For example, al Qaeda and its
affiliates have invested in “ideological training.” ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL-QAEDA: GLOBAL
NETWORK OF TERROR 112–26 (3d ed. 2003). They have “intuitively grasped the enormous communicative
potential of the Internet” in spreading their ideology. HOFFMAN, supra note 230, at 214–20.
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violence is relevant to the signaling problem in domestic counterterrorism because
association, understood in light of this empirical research, shows the two necessary
characteristics of an effective signal.313 First, existence of an appropriate complicit
surround—not just any close or intimate circle of associates, but a group where critiques
of larger society and justifications of violence are common verbal currency—is positively
correlated to the desired trait. Second, it is more costly for the aspirant terrorist to
renounce this complicit surround than for others. There is a negative correlation between
the cost of repudiating, renouncing, or avoiding such complicit surrounds and the
likelihood of becoming a terrorist because complicit surrounds furnish the ethical and
organizational tools that enable terrorism. The absence of a complicit surround is an
effective signal of the absence of terror risk for law enforcement. Further, it is a signal
that is difficult for the aspiring terrorist to mimic. Of course, it is possible to engage in
terrorism without the benefit of a complicit surround. The relation is a probabilistic
correlation, not a logical entailment. The rising level of concern about domestic terrorism
and sleeper cells, however, renders it plausible that in many situations law enforcement
will find some value in the use of associational context as a signal to sort for possible
terrorism risk.
4. Constitutional Objections.—Before turning to the institutional-design questions

implicated by any effort to incorporate these findings about association as a potential
signaling tool in counterterrorism, it is worth asking whether there are constitutional
objections that preclude such reliance. To the civil libertarian, the reorientation of
domestic counterterrorism proposed here may seem unappealing: It appears to trade
government pressure on religious liberty for the sacrifice of associational freedoms that
are protected by another part of the First Amendment. But again, constitutional doctrine
imposes very little constraint on the path proposed here. Gains to constitutional rights are
to be had not from a strict delineation of protected interests but rather by increasing the
efficacy of law enforcement interventions, eliminating tactics that generate errors, and
minimizing overall the volume of false positives.
Like the Religion Clause doctrine examined in Part II, doctrine under the Free

313. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
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Speech Clause is ill designed to address the constitutional externalities of new law
enforcement tactics prompted by terrorism concerns. Free speech doctrine received its
definitive elaboration long after the Amendment’s adoption, with the 1950s and 1960s
being pivotal moments in the Court’s elaboration of doctrinal protection for dissenting
political speech. At the time, judges were immediately motivated by concerns about the
overreach of anti-Communist efforts in Congress and across the states.314 Postbellum
anti-Communism illustrated the perils of guilt by association. “[T]housands of Americans
were targeted, investigated, blacklisted, harassed, and driven from public employment or
office on charges that they were members of or fellow travelers with the Communist
Party.”315 As a result, the Court crafted doctrine with special sensitivity to the risks of
guilt by association. Now-canonical precedent directs that associational conduct can be
punished only when evidence exists that a defendant has a “specific intent” regarding an
organization’s criminal ends.316 This specific intent rule prevents jurors from using
unpopular associational ties as a proxy for dangerousness. It hence mitigates “the special
danger that juries trying defendants who have advocated unpopular social doctrines will
find serious intent on the basis of ambiguous evidence.”317 That is, it responds to and
attempts to mitigate the specific danger to First Amendment values that happened to be
the most salient at the time of the doctrine’s articulation in the Cold War era.
This specific intent rule, however, does not preclude the turn to association to root
out terrorist risk for at least three reasons. First, that rule does not preclude the use of
association at the investigative stage. In investigations, iterative interactions with other
suspects furnish grounds not merely for law enforcement attention but also for individual
searches. It is only when police rely on “mere propinquity” to a crime that search
becomes unlawful.318 Nor do suspects have any constitutional protection against
314. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE 1789–2008, at 232–39
(2009) (describing the Cold War historical context).
315. David Cole, Hanging with the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the Right of Association,
1999 SUP. CT. REV. 203, 216.
316. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966); see also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 262
(1967) (noting the specific intent requirement of the Smith Act); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203,
228–30 (1961) (finding the specific intent requirement to be “fairly implied” from the statute); cf. Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952) (finding a statute that indiscriminately classified innocent activity
with knowing activity to be an unconstitutional assertion of arbitrary power).
317. GREENAWALT, supra note 107, at 266.
318. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979); cf. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372 (2003)
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informants,319 the most frequently used policing tool for piercing complicit surrounds. At
the investigative stage, therefore, concerns about “guilt by association” do little
constraining work.
Second, at the trial stage there is no bar to the introduction of evidence concerning
association as one means of showing specific intent. In announcing the specific intent
rule, the Supreme Court pointed to expressive evidence and directed that while that
material was “not in itself sufficient to show illegal advocacy,” it nonetheless was
admissible and had potential inculpatory “value in showing illegal advocacy.”320 That
dynamic was visible in prosecutions under the Smith Act.321 Smith Act prosecutions
involved “routine introduction” by the prosecution of “massive collections of books,
tracts, pamphlets, newspapers, and manifestoes discussing Communism, Socialism,
Capitalism, Feudalism and governmental institutions in general . . . . Guilt or innocence
. . . turn[ed] on what Marx or Engels or someone else wrote or advocated as much as a
hundred or more years ago.”322 Blocked from using associations against a defendant, the
federal government nevertheless could use her words against her. If specific intent can be
demonstrated by evidence of expressive conduct, it is difficult to see why evidence of
association should not also be probative.
Third, the Supreme Court has recently loosened the First Amendment’s constraint on
criminal penalties for associational conduct. Upholding speech-related applications of
one prong of the material support law, the Court held that speech coordinated with a
proscribed terrorist organization could be criminalized.323 The Court’s decision in Holder
v. Humanitarian Law Project unconvincingly distinguished between constitutional
protection of membership and constitutional indifference to material support in the form
of speech, implying that it was a constitutionally protected activity to join an organization
(upholding searches of all men in an automobile where narcotics were found).
319. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 300–03 (1966) (rejecting Fourth Amendment arguments
against the use of informants).
320. Scales, 367 U.S. at 232–33.
321. See Alien Registration (Smith) Act of 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2385, 2387 (2006)) (criminalizing advocacy of the forceful overthrow of government).
322. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 339 (1957) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The record in Yates consisted of 14,000 pages. Id. at 327 n.34 (majority opinion). Yates’s prosecution
for advocacy of “Marxist-Leninist principles” was “standard fare” in Smith Act cases. GEOFFREY R.
STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 413 (2004).
323. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724–27 (2010).
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but a potentially criminal one to engage in any speech that aided the organization.324 In so
doing, the Court applied a standard of review that, while notionally robust, in practice
resembled rational basis scrutiny of the proffered governmental justifications.325 The net
result was to reduce constitutional protection against guilt by association in a class of
cases defined by the government to a token ban on membership proscription that
government can easily circumvent. As in other areas of the law, the Court’s post-9/11
amendments to constitutional doctrine are less adaptation and more abrogation.
Current constitutional doctrine, in short, has no more of a constraining role with
respect to government use of association as a signal than it does with respect to religious
speech. Constitutional law is path dependent.326 It is shaped by the problems that were
salient when doctrine was fashioned. Change is difficult and costly. And in the face of
rising concerns about terrorism, change in ways favorable to suspects and defendants is
especially unlikely.327
5. Conclusion.—After 9/11, reliance on the signaling function of religious speech in

domestic counterterrorism may have seemed plausible and even necessary in light of al
Qaeda’s open appeal to religious justifications and solidarities. But increasing evidence
from empirical and social science studies of terrorism casts doubt on that approach. There
is scant reason to believe that religious doctrine or speech correlates with political
violence. Rather, the social science and empirical evidence suggests that one of the
regularities of terrorism’s production is the presence of closely knit complicit surrounds
324. See id. at 2730 (“‘The statute does not prohibit being a member of one of the designated groups or
vigorously promoting and supporting the political goals of the group. . . . What [§ 2339B] prohibits is the
act of giving material support . . . .’” (quoting Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th
Cir. 2000))). The protection of membership simpliciter, but not membership plus any affirmative
collaboration, in effect renders collective action impossible.
325. See id. at 2724–31 (affirming that the case was controlled by precedents dictating a high level of
scrutiny but nonetheless liberally hypothesizing as to how plaintiffs’ speech could aid proscribed terrorist
organizations).
326. For a general explanation of path dependency, see Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path
Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 260–62 (2000). For applications in law,
see Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a
Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 603–06 (2001); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,
Supermajority Rules and the Judicial Confirmation Process, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 543, 570 (2005);
R. George Wright, Originalism and the Problem of Fundamental Fairness, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 687, 694
(2008).
327. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Fortune Telling and the Fourth Amendment: Of Terrorism, Slippery
Slopes, and Predicting the Future, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 195, 234–35 (2005) (explaining how fresh acts of
terrorism increase pressure to relax civil liberties).
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in which individual tastes and preferences concerning violence and political change are
reengineered. Evidence of a person’s immediate associations appears correlated with
terrorism’s incidence. It is also costly for aspirant terrorists to mimic nonterrorists by
eschewing such associations. Extending Spence’s model of signaling on job markets, it is
therefore plausible to posit that one way in which law enforcement can sort for possible
terrorist risk is by searching for complicit surrounds of the appropriate kind.
C. Retooling Signaling Policy

For terrorist conspiracies generated domestically—which is the category that law
enforcement is increasingly concerned about—an insular associational environment
serving as the complicit surround appears to be almost always—or at least with great
empirical regularity—pivotal to the production of terrorism. It is more costly for aspirant
terrorists than for members of the general population to give up their complicit surrounds.
But how then can law enforcement use association as a differentially “costly signal”328 to
sort possible aspirant terrorists from the general population? This subpart identifies three
strands of current counterterrorism practice in the United States and the United Kingdom
that build on association as a signal for counterterrorism ends. Its aim is not to endorse
any of these measures, or to evaluate comprehensively costs and benefits, but rather to
point to possibilities.
First, in the United States, police have invested heavily in invasive and
noncooperative tactics such as surveillance, electronic monitoring, and informants. The
New York Police Department (NYPD), for example, aggressively deploys informants
within New York’s Muslim community to monitor conversations there. In 2006,
testimony in the federal criminal prosecution of 23-year-old Shahawar Matin Siraj, who
was charged with plotting an explosion at the Herald Square subway station, revealed that
at least three informants working for the NYPD’s Terrorist Interdiction Unit had been
attending services regularly at a Brooklyn mosque, the Islamic Society of Bay Ridge, in
winter 2003.329 In May 2009, another set of arrests in an alleged terrorist conspiracy

328. Feltovich et al., supra note 225, at 631.
329. See William K. Rashbaum, At Trial on Subway Bomb Plot, Informer Finishes Star Turn, N.Y.
TIMES, May 9, 2006, at B2 (illustrating the mosque police informant’s colorful testimony); William K.
Rashbaum, Closing Arguments in Trial of Subway Bombing Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2006, at B3
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again hinged on the testimony of an informant who cultivated contacts through a
Newburgh, New York, mosque.330
This strategy risks considerable harms. Aggressive use of informants, especially
within religious communities, not only imposes burdens on third parties’ constitutional
rights but also risks false positives.331 In the Siraj case, for example, evidence at trial cast
doubt on whether Siraj would ever have acted absent the informant’s encouragement. A
federal informant in Orange County, California, “aggressively promot[ed] terrorism plots
and tr[ied] to recruit others to join him.”332 Creating complicit surrounds by the
deployment of agent provocateurs may also risk the inefficient deployment of policing
resources even aside from constitutional costs.
An alternative to hostile acquisition of information is the cultivation of informationsharing networks with religious and ethnic minorities through collaborative means. In the
United Kingdom, police have taken this tack. Leading this approach is a new unit within
the Special Branch of London’s Metropolitan Police called the Muslim Contact Unit.
This unit cultivates relations with the London Salafist and Islamist communities with the
aim of identifying potential recruits to violence early. It was formed after a member of
one of these mosques approached local police to urge them to investigate a man called
Richard Reid, later the so-called shoe bomber, who had expressed an interest in
violence.333 The British strategy leverages the insight that transparency will be cheaper

(elaborating on the entrapment defense of a subway plotter caught with help from the mosque informant);
William K. Rashbaum, Window Opens on City Tactics Among Muslims: Getting a Conviction and Causing
Concern, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2006, at B29 (recounting courtroom revelations of the police informants’
activity at an area mosque). For similar stories, see John Caher, Terrorism Trial of Muslims Raises Issues of
Entrapment, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 14, 2006, at 1 (reporting on the trial of businessmen accused of entering into a
money laundering plot with an undercover agent posing as a terrorist); Larry Keller, Disputes Bedevil
Terrorism Arrests: Opinions Diverge on Whether Increased Post-Sept. 11 Arrests Are Justified or Effective
in Fighting the War on Terror, PALM BEACH POST, June 26, 2005, at A1 (highlighting the dilemma posed
in distinguishing “wannabees egged on by [an] undercover agent to make foolish boasts” and serious
terrorists); Walter Pincus, FBI Role in Terror Probe Questioned: Lawyers Point to Fine Line Between Sting
and Entrapment, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2006, at A1 (detailing the role of FBI informants in a nascent
terrorist cell and the possibility of entrapment).
330. William K. Rashbaum & Kareem Fahim, Informer’s Role in Bombing Plot: Looking for Recruits
in a Newburgh Mosque, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2009, at A1.
331. For a general analysis of the legal regulation of confidential informants, see Alexandra Natapoff,
Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645 (2004).
332. Teresa Watanabe & Scott Glover, Man Says He Was FBI Informant, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 2009,
at B1.
333. Robert Lambert, Empowering Salafis and Islamists Against Al-Qaeda: A London Counterterrorism
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for groups that do not intend to cultivate political violence.334 By affirmatively offering
the benefits of a closer relationship with police—for example, by serving as a liaison
between cooperating groups and other parts of the police and government—the Muslim
Contact Unit obtains much of the local knowledge gleaned via informants without the
false positives or damage to constitutional rights and police–community relations.335 The
American reliance on informants, by contrast, may well prove less effective in the long
term than the British approach as trust in the police declines (leading to fewer leads
through cooperation) and potential terrorists find ways to work around the problem of
informants.336
Second, governments have tried to build a more textured understanding of social
contexts in order to more accurately identify complicit surrounds. Some governments
stumbling toward this goal have turned to data-collection efforts so broad-brush and
indiscriminate that they raise concerns about racial and religious profiling. In Germany,
for example, the BfV monitors the publications, statements, meetings, and mosques of
both federally registered and “homegrown,” or underground, civil-society groups even if
these organizations are entirely law-abiding.337 In the United States, similar efforts
proved controversial. In October 2007, for example, the Los Angeles Police Department
(LAPD) announced a decision to implement a “community mapping” plan in order to
“lay out the geographic locations of the many different Muslim population groups around
Los Angeles . . . [and] take a deeper look at their history, demographics, language,
culture, ethnic breakdown, socio-economic status, and social interactions” so as to
“identify communities, within the larger Muslim community, which may be susceptible
to violent ideologically-based extremism.”338 The breadth of the plan, and its presentation

Case Study, 41 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 31, 32 (2008).
334. To be sure, information privacy is valuable to many people without respect to their links to crime
or terror.
335. Lambert, supra note 333, at 32.
336. See, e.g., Teresa Watanabe & Paloma Esquivel, Muslims Say FBI Spying is Causing Anxiety: Use
of an Informant in Orange County Leads Some to Shun Mosques, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009, at B1
(describing community outrage and degradation of the FBI’s reputation with the community as effects of
the FBI’s use of undercover informants in local mosques).
337. INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 212, at 14–15.
338. The Role of Local Law Enforcement in Countering Violent Islamist Extremism: Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov. Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Michael P. Downing,
Commanding Officer, Counter-Terrorism/Criminal Intelligence Bureau, LAPD), available at
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as a fait accompli, elicited vigorous opposition from Los Angeles’s Muslim-American
community. In response, Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa scrapped the plan, citing the “fear
and apprehension” prompted by its disclosure.339
But community mapping may have been a lost opportunity for both police and the
Muslim-American community in Los Angeles. Rather than an invasive, onerous, and
racially disparate scheme of surveillance, the project could have been a collaborative
measure aimed at diminishing the need for more intrusive measures, such as the insertion
of informants into religious communities.340 It could have been the ground for closer
relationships between mosques and police that would not just facilitate more focused
investigations but that would enable community leaders to secure policing against hate
crimes.341 Rather than confrontation, it could have been a platform of cooperation to
alleviate tensions over profiling or intrusive policing.342 Alas, the opportunity was
squandered on both sides.
Third, governments now use information about associations to condition benefits or
privileges in ways that raise the costs of membership in a complicit surround and so sort
for aspirant terrorists. Consider an example from the United Kingdom:
Mr. Tariq commenced employment with the Home Office in April 2003 as an
immigration officer. He received the necessary security clearance. However, in
August 2006, he was suspended from duty due to national security concerns and
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=483590e6-9f4e4aa6-b595-8ca3791e4acb.
339. Richard Winton & Teresa Watanabe, LAPD’s Muslim Mapping Plan Killed, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15,
2007, at A1; see also Richard Winton et al., Outcry over Muslim Mapping, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2007, at
A1 (noting “intense backlash” against the mapping plan and concerns among Muslim activists and civil
libertarians that it amounted to “religious profiling”).
340. Similar frictions arose in the United Kingdom around the government’s “Prevent” strategy, which
included local government agencies in counterterrorism strategies. Some Muslim community groups
objected to “the requirement in the [Prevent] strategy for local authorities to have a ‘sophisticated
understanding of local Muslim communities.’” HOUSE OF COMMONS COMMUNITIES & LOCAL GOV’T
COMM., PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: SIXTH REPORT OF SESSION 2009–10, at 15 (2010),
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcomloc/65/65.pdf [hereinafter HOUSE OF
COMMONS REPORT]. Non-Muslim ethnic groups also objected to the greater local government attention
toward Muslims. Id. at 18.
341. See Tom R. Tyler, Stephen J. Schulhofer & Aziz Z. Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in
Counterterrorism: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 L. & SOC. REV. 365 (2010) (presenting empirical
evidence that public cooperation in counterterrorism efforts is linked to public perceptions of police
procedural justice).
342. Cf. KEPEL, supra note 294, at 8 (“The most important battle in the war for Muslim minds during
the next decade will be fought not in Palestine or Iraq but in these communities of believers on the outskirts
of London, Paris, and other European cities, where Islam is already a growing part of the West.”).
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on 20 December 2006 all levels of security clearance were withdrawn from him.
He was told that this was based on his close association with individuals
suspected of planning to mount terrorist attacks and that it was considered that
association with such individuals might put him at risk of their attempting to
exert influence on him to abuse his position as an immigration officer.343
The fact of association with a potential complicit surround was here the basis for
denial of an employment-related benefit. The same approach, it is worth noting, is
feasible under U.S. law because of the absence of judicial review of such employment
decisions.344 More generally, this tactic raises the possibility that association can be used
to condition benefits in ways that sort for potential terrorism risk.
Again, this approach raises risks of inqeuitable error and collateral harm. At a
minimum, in cases like Mr. Tariq’s, it would seem generally feasible for the state to
mitigate those costs by reassigning the barred individual to an equivalent, nonsensitive
position and by taking steps to dissipate any downstream reputational consequences of
the transfer. Alternatively, government might use subsidies to sort among private groups
and to encourage groups to be transparent so as to preclude their functioning as a
complicit surround. Groups that aim at violence will find transparency more costly than
groups that are innocent. Insularity is more valuable to the former. Of course, this is not
to say that transparency has no cost for nonterrorist groups. Privacy and resistance to
state surveillance are valued by many private groups. Private groups allow ideas and
norms to develop free of potentially distorting state influences by providing “a vital
margin of political safety from control by outside elites.”345 Social spaces free of state
supervision “enable[] people to engage in worthwhile activities in ways that they would
otherwise find difficult or impossible.”346 Rather, the point is that transparency will be
343. Home Office v. Tariq, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 462, [2] (Eng.).
344. Federal courts have declined to review the merits of decisions to deny security clearances. See
Bennett v. Chertoff, 425 F.3d 999, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Because the authority to issue a security
clearance is a discretionary function of the Executive Branch and involves the complex area of foreign
relations and national security, employment actions based on denial of security clearance are not subject to
judicial review, including under Title VII.”); Ryan v. Reno, 168 F.3d 520, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (collecting
like authority from other circuits).
345. JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN
CONDITION HAVE FAILED 54 (1998).
346. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 484 (2006); see also Julie E.
Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1427–28
(2000) (“Informational privacy . . . is a constitutive element of a civil society in the broadest sense of that
term.”).
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more costly for a group connected to terrorism than for one concerned with privacy
alone. A group aimed at political violence has an additional and especially powerful
reason for valuing the freedom from state supervision. By finding ways to enable
suspected groups to signal the absence of terrorism risk through transparency, the state
may be able to better isolate possible threats from some larger pool of suspects.
Although current constitutional doctrine forbids the state from conditioning subsidies
on the forfeiture of constitutional rights,347 government can channel funds to religious or
ethnic groups that affirmatively engage in collaborative partnerships with law
enforcement. In the United Kingdom, the British government has channeled funding to
some domestic imams through a program called “the Radical Middle Way,” which is
aimed at promoting nonrejectionist strands of Islam.348 In October 2006, the British
government announced £5 million scheme to be disbursed through local governments to
train imams, establish study circles for young people, and engage with at-risk youth.349
Several of these interventions explicitly aimed to strengthen “mainstream Islamic voices”
at the expense of more marginal groups.350 In the United States, similar efforts occur in
the foreign-aid realm. The U.S. Agency for International Development has programs in
Indonesia that “promote[] a moderate or liberal form of Islam over more extreme sects”
via conditional federal funding.351 Such efforts have been controversial. Critics in the
United Kingdom have argued that they have the effect of “singling out” Muslims from
other ethnic communities.352 The flow of funding may also “reinforc[e] the Muslim
347. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006) (stating that the
government cannot withhold benefits from a person due the constitutionally protected exercise of free
speech, even if the person is not entitled to the benefit).
348. Birt, supra note 91, at 701–02.
349. See HOUSE OF COMMONS, COMMUNITIES & LOCAL GOV’T COMM., PREVENTING VIOLENT
EXTREMISM PATHFINDER FUND 2007/08: CASE STUDIES 4 (2007) (discussing the objectives of the
Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund, including establishing dialogues with communities and
working with mosques and educational institutions, and deciding to increase the funding available to six
million pounds for fiscal year 2007–2008); see also HOUSE OF COMMONS, COMMUNITIES & LOCAL GOV’T
COMM., PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP FUND GUIDANCE 3 (2008)
(describing availability of funds for community groups); Alan Travis, New Plan to Tackle Violent
Extremism, GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 3, 2008 (describing the plan as a “nationwide ‘deradicalisation’
programme”).
350. HM GOVERNMENT, THE PREVENT STRATEGY: A GUIDE FOR LOCAL PARTNERS IN ENGLAND 18
(2008).
351. Jessica Powley Hayden, Note, Mullahs on a Bus: The Establishment Clause and U.S. Foreign Aid,
95 GEO. L.J. 171, 179 (2006).
352. HOUSE OF COMMONS REPORT, supra note 340, at 21 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

72

identity because it only approaches Muslims through their faith rather than recognizing
that everyone, all communities, all people, has lots of different identities and multiple
identities.”353 Such criticisms may be blunted by careful policy design. They may also
lose their force if the alternative is more coercive forms of law enforcement.
This method of distinguishing dangerous groups has a historical precedent of sorts.
In the aftermath of the English Civil War, the English 1689 Toleration Act relieved
Protestant dissenters of the statutory penalties that had previously been imposed on them
out of fear of their political disloyalty—but at a price: “[D]issenters had to certify the
place of their congregation to local authorities, . . . they had to leave the doors of their
chapels unlocked during meetings, and . . . they had to take oaths of fidelity.”354 The
price of avoiding generalized suspicion of sedition, in short, was increased
transparency—literally opening their doors to the state. In the short term, this imposed a
heavy cost on a minority of religious dissenting groups. In the long term, however,
historians argue that it eased the path of religious toleration in Britain as “the monopoly
of the established Church gave way to consumers’ choice in religion.”355 Short-term
costs, therefore, may be balanced by the long-term gain in the mitigation of friction and
animus directed at minority groups.
V.

Conclusion
One of the most difficult challenges in contemporary counterterrorism policy is

identifying signals or proxies for the risk of terrorism in an information-poor context. By
drift or default, law enforcement has turned to religious speech to serve as that signal in
American and British domestic counterterrorism. In the American context, the First
Amendment, which might be thought to preclude such reliance, in fact places few
constraints on this approach. As has been generally the case, constitutional doctrine has
not adapted or responded to the way in which post-9/11 counterterrorism policies may
impose new costs on constitutional rights. Although constitutional doctrine yields no
353. Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Vikram Dodd, Communities Fear Project to
Counter
Extremism
Is
Not
What
It
Seems,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 19,
2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/oct/16/prevent-counter-islamic-extremism-intelligence
(noting
concerns about information sharing as a consequence of the Prevent strategy).
354. Philip Hamburger, More Is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835, 840 (2004) (citing the Toleration Act, 1689,
1 W. & M., c.18 (Eng.)).
355. CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE CENTURY OF REVOLUTION, 1603–1714, at 211–12 (1961).
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impetus for the state to change tack, the emerging social science evidence about terrorism
suggests a reason for rebooting. That literature shows there is scant evidence of a
correlation between religious speech or particular religious ideologies and terrorism. By
contrast, one observed regularity in the incidence of terrorism is the salience of complicit
surrounds in the development of terrorism. Governments should focus on association,
rather than religious speech. Law enforcement policies are already edging tentatively
toward this goal, albeit in occasionally problematic ways. This Article has aimed to
encourage further experimentation and investment to that end as part of a larger ongoing
reconsideration of the first generation of post-9/11 responses to al Qaeda-related
terrorism.

Readers with comments may address them to:
Professor Aziz Z. Huq
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
huq@uchicago.edu
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